Socrates: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
Polus: Certainly.
Socrates: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?
Polus: Truly.
Socrates: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
Polus: That is evident.
Socrates: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the affection of the agent?
Polus: I agree.
Socrates: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?
Polus: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
Socrates: And suffering implies an agent?
Polus: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
Socrates: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: And therefore he acts justly?
Polus: Justly.
Socrates: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?
Polus: That is evident.
Socrates: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
Polus: Certainly.
Socrates: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?
Polus: True.
Socrates: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is either pleasant or useful?