Polus: To be sure, Socrates.
Socrates: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?
Polus: I should.
Socrates: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?
Polus: Exactly so.
Socrates: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
Polus: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
Socrates: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
Polus: Certainly.
Socrates: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them?
Polus: Most true.
Socrates: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?
Polus: You are right.
Socrates: Hence we may infer, that if anyone, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?
Polus: Yes.
Socrates: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?
Polus: Well, I suppose not.
Socrates: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state?
Polus: He will not.
Socrates: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
Polus: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw anyone killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!