14. To that which is objected, that the soul of Christ is adored with latria on account of the union with the majesty, etc.: it must be said that the case is not similar, because adoration is an act that is owed to the nature itself by reason of the person. For the honor that is shown to Christ is shown neither to the soul by itself nor to the body, but to the person in whom those two subsist: but knowledge is an act proceeding from the power of the soul itself. And just as the divine and human natures in Christ are distinct, so they have diverse powers and operations, and thereby diverse wisdoms and cognitions, but not thus diverse honors. And therefore the case is not similar.
15. To the objection that where there is fullness of wisdom, it is superfluous to posit what is partial: it must be said that this is true in the same subject and according to the same respect. But when it is said that Christ had the fullness of wisdom, this is according to His uncreated nature, if it is understood of fullness simply and beyond any genus; if however it is understood of fullness within a genus, then it can belong to the created nature, and this is in a certain way partial (ex parte) in relation to fullness simply speaking; nor is it superfluous, because it is more proportioned to the soul itself, since the soul by itself could not nakedly grasp that immensity of uncreated wisdom.
16. To the objection that nature does not act through many means, etc.: it must be said that this is true if something is done equally well and in an orderly manner through one means as through many; but this is not the case here, and this is not on account of a defect in the illuminating wisdom itself, but on account of the nature of the receiving soul itself, as is clear from what has been said above.
17. To the objection concerning material lights, it must be said that the case is not similar, because one of those lights does not dispose toward the other; rather, each has its own proper and distinct being in itself, and therefore the operation of one appears less than the operation of the other, which on account of its excellence claims dominion for itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because created wisdom disposes toward uncreated wisdom, nor does the created shine except through the uncreated, nor is the uncreated attained except through the disposing action of the created.
18. To the objection concerning the distance between created and uncreated knowledge, and between opinion and knowledge: it must be said that the case is not similar, because opinion and knowledge are in the same subject and according to the same respect and with regard to the same object, having diverse and opposed conditions; but created and uncreated wisdom, although they differ in nature, do not nevertheless inhere according to the same respect, nor do they have conditions that are so opposed and incompossible; rather, their conditions are necessarily concomitant, because nothing created subsists except through the uncreated. And thus the response to all the objections is clear.