7. To that which is objected, that of opposite effects the proximate and immediate causes are opposite, etc.: it must be said that this holds true in constricted causes, which do not produce many things except through many, and therefore do not produce opposites except through opposites; but not in the cause of causes, which has no constriction or limitation, but complete freedom with respect to the production of effects, however different they may be.
8. To that which is objected, that number was the supreme exemplar in the mind of the Creator: it must be said that this is said not because number properly exists in God, since number consists in the aggregation of diverse units, but because God himself knows the number according to which all the proportions of things to be created are determined.
Or if it is said anywhere that in God there is a number of ideas, that departs from the notion of number properly so called, just as also the number of persons, which is not through the multiplication of units, but through the replication of the same unity with respect to diverse hypostases; so also the number of ideas or reasons does not signify a multiplication of eternal units, since that unity is only one, but the relation of that unity itself to the many things to be expressed.
9. To the objection that to know distinctly contributes to the perfection of knowledge, etc., it must be said that the act of knowing regards the knower himself and the thing known: whence to know distinctly can be taken in two ways: either on the part of the knower, or on the part of the thing known. Although to know distinctly on the part of the thing known contributes to the perfection of knowledge, it does not however on the part of the knower, because it is more perfect to know many things by one means than by many.
Alternatively it can be said that to know distinctly is twofold: either such that it denotes distinction according to essential diversity, or such that it denotes exemplary or cognitive expression. In the first way it contributes to the perfection of knowledge on the part of the thing known; in the second way on the part of the knower; and in this way God knows most distinctly, because the eternal truth, although one, nevertheless most distinctly expresses various things, no distinction being found in itself on this account.
10. To the objection that God knows things within and without uniformly, etc., it must be said that if it is understood in the sense that He does not have knowledge of things from without, but only from within, then the foregoing statement is true. But if it is understood in the sense that He knows things to be in the same way within and without, it is false: because within Himself He has them under complete real indifference, and He knows that He has them thus; but without He knows them to have being under manifold difference.
11. To the objection that like is known by like, it must be said that that inference holds for a restricted likeness, which is in a genus; and therefore it has no place in the matter at hand.
Or it must be said that this is not a likeness according to agreement, but only according to exemplative expression; and this likeness or unlikeness does not posit a difference of notion to notion, or of likeness to likeness, but according to that which it connotes and expresses outside itself.
12. To the objection that what is like to one opposite is unlike to its opposite, it must be said that this holds for a likeness which is through participation in a common nature, or through a limited expression, such as that which is received from a thing outside.
13. To the objection that that likeness is either according to the whole or according to a part, it must be said that it is according to the whole, because it is called a likeness insofar as it is expressive and expresses the whole.
And if one objects that no diverse things can be assimilated to the same thing according to the whole, it must be said that this is true of that likeness which is through communication, not through expression. - And if one asks how this can be understood, it must be said, as was stated above, that this is because that likeness is beyond genus and is pure act, and all other things are material in relation to it.
14. To the objection that it is either a common likeness or a proper one: it must be said that whatever belongs to completeness in a creature must be attributed to God; and therefore it is in a certain way common, because it expresses all things commonly, and in a certain way proper, because it expresses each thing perfectly and integrally.
15. To the objection that A is not B: it must be said that in divine things, for one to be truly denied of the other, there need not be a real distinction according to what they are, but according to what they connote: as is clear from the fact that predestination is not reprobation, and this is because, although the significatum of both is the same, namely the divine essence or will, the connotatum is nevertheless one thing and another, namely glory and punishment.
16. To the objection that the likeness of a man is not the likeness of a donkey, etc.: the response is clear: for this is not by reason of the divine truth, which relates equally to expressing man and donkey, but by reason of the connotatum; just as we say that to create a man is not to create an angel.
17. To the objection that if there is a plurality according to reason, either something in reality corresponds to it, or nothing: it must be said that something corresponds to it.
But if it is asked what that something is: I say that on the part of divine truth there corresponds only one thing, which nevertheless is more powerful in representing many things than any created multiformity, because, although that truth is simple, it is nevertheless infinite. On the part of the connotata, however, there corresponds a plurality either actual or potential. For many possibles are many things actually known, even though they do not actually exist in their proper nature.
18. To the objection that if they differ by reason of the connotatum, then something temporal is the cause of something eternal: it must be said that one can speak of the connotatum in two ways: either with respect to its proper being, or insofar as it is connoted. With respect to its proper being, it is true that it is temporal; nevertheless it is eternally connoted, because what is temporal in its proper being is eternally known by God.
19. To the objection that the Word ought similarly to be multiplied if the ratio is multiplied by reason of the connotatum: it must be said that the case is not similar, because the Word signifies the divine operative or expressive power itself, which according to reality and the manner of understanding pertains more to the side of God. But the idea or ratio signifies an expression or likeness which, although according to reality it pertains more to the side of God who knows, nevertheless according to the manner of understanding pertains more to the side of the thing known: and therefore, although they have unity in reality, such that many ideas can be called one truth and one Word, they nevertheless cannot have unity in reason, such that many ideas or rationes can be called one idea or one ratio.
20. To the objection that things are caused by the divine reasons, and therefore the plurality as well, etc., it must be said that the plurality of things in their proper genus is from the plurality of reasons: but the plurality of reasons is nothing other than the things themselves, as they exist in their cause. Whence, although the plurality of ideas or reasons in some way has a corresponding plurality of things, it is nevertheless not caused by it, because God does not know many things, nor does the divine truth express many things, because many things are going to exist; but rather conversely, because He knows many things, therefore many things come to be, as Augustine says in the eleventh book of the City of God: "This world could not be known to us unless it existed; but to God, unless it were known, it could not exist."
21. To the objection that the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species, it must be said that the cases are not alike, because the plurality of persons is on account of origin and on account of the mutual and intrinsic relation of person to person; but one idea or reason does not originate from another, nor do they have a mutual or intrinsic relation, nor can they have a real relation to anything outside, because to have a relation to something extrinsic in some way implies dependence and does not permit that in which it is posited to be supremely simple and absolute. And therefore a real plurality of ideas in no way befits the divine being, which is most simple and most absolute. If therefore a plurality is posited there, it must be posited according to the manner of understanding, as was said before, and as the ancient doctors commonly held. — And through this the solution to the objections is clear.