QUESTION III. Whether God knows things through likenesses that are really distinct.
Supposing that God knows things through exemplar likenesses, it is asked whether through likenesses that are really distinct. And that this is so appears:
1. By authority. Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, the question on ideas: "If it cannot rightly be said or believed that God made all things irrationally, it remains that all things were made by reason, nor was man made by the same reason as the horse: for this is absurd to suppose: therefore individual things were created by their own proper reasons."
2. Likewise, in the same place: "Ideas are unchangeable forms that are contained in the divine intelligence": but every form is a thing: therefore if there are many forms, there are many things. If therefore the ideas are many, it is necessary that they be really distinct.
3. Likewise, Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter five: "We say that exemplars in God are the substance-making reasons of existing things, singularly pre-existing, which theology calls predefinitions "; but of diverse things the substance-making reasons are diverse: therefore since created things are really diverse, it is necessary that those substance-making reasons be really distinct.
4. Likewise, the Philosopher, Metaphysics VII: "Every agent acting according to an exemplar is at the end of its operation the form of the thing produced"; but God is an agent acting according to an exemplar: therefore if the completive forms of things made have a real difference, it is necessary that those exemplar reasons have a real diversity.
5. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason. God is an agent acting from purpose; but an agent acting from purpose does not produce things unless it has them within itself: therefore if it produces a diversity of things, it is necessary that it have them within itself under the aspect of diversity: but it does not have them except through their reasons: therefore it is necessary that the reasons of things be really diversified.
6. Likewise, whatever things have they receive from God: therefore since they have diversity among themselves, they receive it from that most noble art: therefore if they receive it thence, it is necessary that it be found there. But it is not there except in the exemplar reasons: therefore it is necessary that those be really distinct.
7. Likewise, of opposite effects the proximate and immediate and uniformly acting causes are opposite; but the exemplar reasons of things are proximate and immediate and uniformly acting causes: therefore since they are causes of things not only diverse but also opposite, it is necessary that they not only be really distinct, but also be mutually opposed.
8. Likewise, "number, as Boethius says, was the principal exemplar in the mind of the Creator"; and Augustine in the second book of On Free Will says that number and wisdom are the same: and it is established that exemplar number is not found in God except with respect to the exemplar reasons. If therefore number posits true plurality, and in those reasons the nature of number is truly and properly posited: therefore truly and properly a real diversity is posited.
9. Again, to know distinctly contributes to the perfection of knowledge; therefore, the most perfect knowledge knows most distinctly. But God does not know things except in the manner in which he has them within himself; therefore, it is necessary that he have them within himself most distinctly. But he does not have them except through their reasons; therefore, it is necessary that these be most distinct; therefore, there is not only a distinction according to reason there, but also according to reality.
10. Again, God does not know things within himself and outside himself differently, but rather uniformly. But outside himself he knows them under a real distinction; therefore also within himself. But he knows in the manner in which he has them; therefore he has them within himself as really distinct.
11. Again, like is known by like: this is true per se, since Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity: "All knowledge according to species is similar to the thing which is known." Therefore, by opposites, the dissimilar is known by the dissimilar. But dissimilar things are really known; therefore the reasons of knowing are also really dissimilar, and therefore also really different.
12. Again, what is similar to one of two opposites as such is dissimilar to its opposite. Therefore, if the idea of white is similar to white, it is dissimilar to black; by equal reasoning, the idea of black is also dissimilar to white. Therefore, it is necessary that the ideas of white and black be dissimilar to each other, and therefore also really different.
13. Again, an idea is a likeness: therefore either according to the whole, or according to a part. If according to a part: then through it the thing is never totally known. If according to the whole: but whatever things are similar according to the whole to some one thing are dissimilar according to the whole in no respect. Therefore, if there were one likeness of creatures according to reality, it would be impossible for them to be really different. But it is evident that they really differ; therefore, it is necessary that a real difference of exemplar likenesses correspond to them.
14. Again, the exemplar reason is a likeness of the known thing: therefore either a common or a proper likeness. If common: then through it the properties of things are not known. If proper: but proper likenesses are multiplied according to the plurality of things. If, therefore, created things are really diverse, it is necessary that their likenesses also really differ from one another.
15. Again, let A be called the reason by which man was made, and B the reason by which a donkey was made. It is certain that A is not B. If, therefore, those things of which one is not predicated of the other in the divine differ really, and not only according to reason, it seems that those are really diverse. The minor is manifest, because although goodness, wisdom, and power differ in reason, nevertheless they are predicated of one another.
16. Furthermore, A is not a likeness of a donkey, nor is B a likeness of a man: therefore A in some way approaches man more than it approaches a donkey: but this would not be the case unless A in some way agreed more with man than B; but this could not be unless it in some way had a real difference: therefore etc.
17. Furthermore, if those ideal reasons are multiplied by reason, either something corresponds to the reason, or nothing. If nothing: then it is empty: if something: then it is necessary in some way that there be a real difference in those reasons.
18. Furthermore, those reasons either differ by reason of what is connoted, or by reason of themselves. If by reason of what is connoted: then since that is temporal, a temporal thing will be the cause of an eternal thing; if by reason of themselves; but things that are distinguished by themselves differ really: therefore those reasons are really diversified.
19. Furthermore, if they differ by reason of what is connoted: then since the Word connotes the effect more than a reason or idea does — because, as is said in the Eighty-Three Questions, "the Word signifies operative power" — it seems therefore that if this were the cause, there would be said to be many words in the divine: but it is established that this is false: therefore for many reasons to be spoken of, the difference of what is connoted does not suffice.
20. Furthermore, caused things are from the reasons and not conversely: therefore the plurality of reasons is also prior to the plurality of connoted things: therefore if they are multiplied, the difference of what is connoted does not bring this about; it is necessary therefore that they be really distinguished by themselves.
21. Furthermore, the plurality of persons is greater than the plurality of species or reasons: but a real difference of persons is not repugnant to the divine simplicity: therefore neither is a real plurality of ideal reasons. If therefore, as the Saints say, they are many: it seems that it must be acknowledged that they are really different.
But to the contrary: 1. Dionysius, in the fifth chapter of On the Divine Names, speaking of God says thus: "He pre-contains all things in himself according to the one excellence of simplicity, rejecting all duplicity." If therefore God pre-contains things in himself through the reasons of things: and those reasons reject all duplicity: therefore they have no real diversity.
2. Furthermore, in the same place: "The one sun uniformly pre-receives in itself the causes of the many participants; much more strongly must it be granted that in the cause of the sun itself and of all things, the exemplars of all existing things pre-exist according to a supersubstantial union"; but this would not be so if those reasons were really distinct: therefore they have no real diversity.