QUESTION II.
Whether God knows things through likenesses of things, or through their essence.
Supposing that God knows infinite things, it is asked whether He knows those things which He knows through likenesses of things, or through their essence. And that it is through likenesses, seems to be shown:
1. First, by the authority of Scripture. John 1: What was made, in Him was life: therefore all things that were made previously existed in God who knows: therefore either through likeness or through truth: but not through truth, since nothing yet existed: therefore through likeness.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity says that "the Son is the art full of all living and unchangeable reasons"; but reasons in an art are nothing other than likenesses of things made by art and known by the artisan: therefore the same as before.
3. Likewise, Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity, chapter eleven, says: "All knowledge according to species is similar to the thing which it knows"; but divine knowledge, since it is not according to privation, is according to species: therefore it is necessary that it be similar to the thing which it knows. But it would not be similar unless it had a likeness of the thing: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the Philosopher says "that the intellect is in a certain way all things"; but this is for no other reason than that the one who understands, by the very fact that he understands, is assimilated to the thing understood: therefore if this belongs to the general nature of understanding: if God understands and knows anything, it is necessary that He have likenesses of the things which He knows: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, for something to be perfectly known, there must be an adequation of the intellect to the intelligible; but a created thing cannot be adequated to the creating intellect through its own nature, since the latter is simple and the former composite: therefore it is necessary that it be adequated to it through some simple likeness separated from all matter: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, God knows things in the same way after they were made as He knew them before they were made, because divine knowledge does not change: but before they were made, He could not know them through their own essences: and He knew them either through their likenesses or through their essences: and not through their essences: therefore through their likenesses. And He knows now in the same way as then, therefore etc.
7. Likewise, God is an agent acting from purpose; but every agent acting from purpose preconceives that which it is about to make: moreover, everything that preconceives something has it in some way within itself, either through truth or through likeness: therefore if, before things were made, God did not have them within Himself with respect to their essences, then with respect to their likenesses.
8. Likewise, God is an exemplar truly and properly, just as He is truly and properly an efficient cause and an end: but an exemplar truly and properly is nothing other than what has likenesses of the things exemplified, through which it knows and makes them: therefore just as the nature of exemplarity belongs to God, so also does the nature of likeness.
9. Again, God truly is an eternal mirror leading to the knowing of every other knowable thing: but a mirror does not lead to the knowing of another thing unless it has its likeness: therefore the same as before.
10. Again, God truly and properly is a word: but a word is a likeness of that which is spoken: therefore if the Son of God is the word by which all things are spoken, it is necessary that in him there be likenesses of all things spoken.
11. Again, two things concur for the perfection of cognition, namely light and likeness: but the account of the most perfect light is entirely preserved in divine cognition: therefore likewise also the account of an expressive likeness.
To the contrary: 1. Anselm in the Monologion, chapter thirty-one: "It is manifest that in the Word, through whom all things were made , there is not a likeness of those things, but true and simple essence": therefore if God does not know through something outside himself, he does not know through a likeness, but rather through essence.
2. Again, wherever there is likeness, there is agreement, and wherever there is agreement, there is communication of some one thing by many: but God and creature share nothing one in common, because then that thing would be simpler than the Creator: therefore it is impossible that there be any likeness in the Creator with respect to the creature, or conversely.
3. Again, likeness is a relation of equiparance; but between the Creator and the creature there can be no relation of equiparance: therefore neither likeness.
4. Again, just as equality is caused by unity in quantity, so likeness is caused by unity in quality; but between the Creator and the creature equality is in no way found, neither truly nor metaphorically: therefore neither likeness for the same reason: or if likeness is found there and not equality, the question is asked, whence this may be.
5. Again, if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is the least: therefore if likeness is the ground of knowing, speaking per se, where there is greater likeness, there is a greater ground of knowing, and where there is the least, the least: if therefore God knows things through likenesses, it follows from this that he would have the least knowledge of things: which is blasphemous to say.
6. Again, one creature is more assimilated to God than another, as that which exists, lives, and senses, more than that which merely exists: if therefore greater likeness is a greater ground of knowing, then God knows one creature more than another.
7. Again, if our intellect were entirely in act, it would not need a likeness: therefore since the divine intellect is entirely in act and is light with respect to every knowable thing, it seems that no account of likeness is required for God's cognition.
8. Again, likeness is a ground leading to another, namely to that of which it is a likeness: but where there is such a leading, there is discursion and ratiocinative comparison, and this in no way befits divine cognition: therefore neither does the account of likeness.
9. Again, truth is the principle of knowing; therefore in the most excellent cognition the character of truth is most excellently preserved. But truth is more preserved in the thing itself than in its likeness. Therefore, if divine cognition is the most noble, it knows things not through likenesses but through essences.
10. Again, the Philosopher, in the third book of On the Soul: "In things separated from matter, that which is understood and that by which it is understood are the same." But God is entirely separated from matter; therefore that which he knows and that by which he knows are the same. But he knows things outside himself; therefore he knows them through their essences, not through any likenesses.
11. Again, wherever there is an immediate and undivided conjunction of the knower and the knowable, there is no need for a likeness. But God is intimate to every created thing; therefore for his cognition he does not need any likeness.