QUESTION I. Whether the knowledge of Christ, insofar as He is the Word, actually extends to infinite things.
It is asked concerning the knowledge of Christ, insofar as He is the Word, whether it actually extends to infinite things. And that it does is shown:
1. First, by the authority of Augustine, in the twelfth book of the City of God, chapter eighteen: "The infinity of number, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is nevertheless not incomprehensible to Him whose understanding is without number ."
2. Likewise, the same author in the eleventh book of the City of God, chapter ten, speaking of the wisdom of God, says thus: "Nor are there many, but there is one wisdom, in which there are certain infinite, and to it finite, treasures of intelligible things," etc.
3. Likewise, it is shown by reason thus. The simpler a substance is, the more things it can know: therefore a substance that is infinitely more simple than any created substance knows infinitely more than any creature: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, God actually comprehends both His own essence and His own power; but God can do infinite things: therefore if He actually knows His entire power, He actually comprehends infinite things: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, it is a mark of nobility in a creature to know many things, and of greater nobility still to know more: therefore knowledge that is of infinite nobility extends to infinite things: therefore, etc.
6. Likewise, God knows more things than He can do, because He knows the evils of sin, which He cannot do; but He can do infinite things: therefore He also knows more than infinite things.
7. Likewise, whoever knows a point according to its substance and power knows it not only in itself, but also those things that can emanate from it; but infinite lines can emanate from one point: therefore if in any line there are infinite points, and from any point infinite lines can proceed, and God comprehends the power of every creature; therefore He knows not only infinite things, but also infinitely times infinite things.
8. Likewise, whatever the human intellect understands in potency or has in potency, the divine intellect has in act and more, because the created can be equaled to the uncreated neither in act nor in potency: but the human possible intellect extends to infinite things, because it never knows so many that it cannot know more: therefore if the divine intellect is actually directed to more than the human intellect, it actually extends to more than infinite things.
9. Likewise, by impossibility: because if God knew only finite things, since for every finite thing something greater can be devised, something could be conceived greater than divine knowledge; but this is impossible: therefore, etc.
10. Likewise, if He knew finite things, either He could know something beyond them, or not. If not, then His knowledge would be limited: if so, but whoever can know something that he does not know can learn: which is impious to say of God: therefore, etc.
11. Likewise, if He knew only those things that are, and not those that can come to be; since a created artisan knows many things that he can make and never will make, a man would know something that would be hidden from God: but this is false and impossible: therefore, etc.
Contra: 1. Everything known is true, and everything true is a being: therefore if infinite things are known, there are infinite beings: but the consequent is impossible: therefore so is the antecedent.
2. Likewise, whatever God knows he judges; but whatever he judges is such as he judges it to be, and so many: but whatever God judges he apprehends as finite: therefore whatever he knows is finite.
If you say that it does not follow—because it is finite to God, therefore it is finite—on the contrary: each thing is such in itself as it is according to the judgment of truth: therefore if something is finite to God, it is necessary that it be finite absolutely.
3. Likewise, everything infinite is untraversable both by the infinite and by the finite, because by whatever it were traversed it would receive a terminus: therefore it would be finite: but whatever the divine intellect knows it comprehends and traverses: therefore if infinite things are untraversable, infinite things are unknowable.
4. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows distinctly: but whatever he distinguishes he numbers, and whatever is numbered is measured, and all such things are finite: therefore whatever is known by God is finite.
5. Likewise, every number is either even or odd: therefore whatever is numbered by God is numbered by an even or an odd number: but every even number is divisible into two equals, and likewise every odd number when the unit is removed: but every such number is finite: therefore if God numbers whatever he knows, it is necessary that he numbers them by a finite number: therefore they are finite: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, whatever God knows he knows in an ordered manner: but wherever there is order, there is the notion of a first and a last, which is the notion of the finite: if therefore wherever there is the notion of order there is the notion of finitude, and God knows nothing without order, because he knows nothing in a disordered manner: it is impossible for God to know infinite things.
7. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, they are either infinite to him, or to us, or in themselves. If infinite to us, this is not a great thing to say, because those things are finite absolutely. If to him: but whatever things are infinite to someone are not knowable by him nor comprehended by him: therefore if God knows infinite things, he does not comprehend infinite things. If infinite in themselves: but a thing other than God, by the very fact that it is other, is a creature, and by the very fact that it is a creature, is limited: therefore to know other things as infinite is to know finite things as infinite: which is false and unintelligible, because it implies a contradiction in itself.
8. Likewise, if God knows infinite things, they are either infinite in their cause, or in their proper genus. If infinite in their cause: but everything that is in its cause is one: therefore whatever he knows as in its cause he knows by way of unity, not therefore by way of infinite things. If infinite in act and in their proper genus: but for infinite things to exist in act in their proper genus is false and impossible: therefore it is false and impossible for God to know infinite things.
9. Again, let every knowable thing known by God be called A: then I inquire thus: A is either God or something other than God. If it is God: then what is known by God is God: therefore a donkey is God. If something other than God: every such thing is actually finite: therefore A is actually finite; and A designates all knowable things: therefore all knowable things are finite: therefore etc.
10. Again, A is either equal to God, or less, or greater. If less than God: therefore finite: if equal, or greater: therefore it is God: therefore if God knows infinite things, God knows nothing but God: and if He knows nothing but God, He does not know infinitely: therefore if He knows infinite things, He does not know infinite things.
11. Again, since there is in God a power of making and a power of knowing, and each is infinite, and the power of making always makes finitely: it seems that the power of knowing always knows things finite in act; or if not, why not? This is to ask, since in God there is willing, knowing, and making, and willing and making do not extend to infinite things: how does knowing extend to infinite things, since the middle does not exceed the extremes.