16. Furthermore, the celestial hierarchy does not have any one person to whom it is subject through obedience except God alone: therefore it seems that neither should the terrestrial or ecclesiastical hierarchy have any one person except only the mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.
CONCLUSION.
Although diverse men are bound by many bonds to the subjection of obedience to diverse persons, according to the diversity of ranks, offices, and powers: nevertheless this variety ought to be reduced to one supreme and first Bishop, in whom the universal sovereignty over all principally resides: and not only to Christ himself, but also by divine right to his Vicar: and this indeed most fittingly, since the order of universal justice, the unity of the Church, and stability in both require this.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing, it should be noted that although diverse persons are bound to diverse others by many bonds to the subjection of obedience, according to what the Apostle says: Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, Romans 13, and this according to the diversity of ranks, offices, and powers: nevertheless all this variety must be reduced to one supreme and first person, in whom the universal sovereignty over all principally resides: not only to God himself and Christ, the mediator of God and men, but also to his Vicar; and this not by human statute, but by divine statute, by which Christ established Peter as the prince of the Apostles, whom he established as princes over the whole earth. Moreover, Christ did this most fittingly, because the order of universal justice, the unity of the Church, and stability in both required this.
For the order of universal justice required this both with respect to natural justice and with respect to civil justice and with respect to celestial or spiritual justice.
Natural justice, by which the elements of the world and the whole machine of the universe are ordered, requires that among locating bodies there be one first locating body, among mobile things one first mobile, among luminous things one principally radiating, among movers one first mover, and universally "in any given genus there be one first thing, by which all things contained in that genus are measured."
Natural justice in the lesser world also requires that there be one principal member, from which the rest receive influence according to truth, as the heart, according to evidence, as the head; that there also be one power principally governing all the powers of the soul and of the whole man, namely free choice.
Civil justice also requires that there be one principal judge, by whom the final decision of cases is made; also one principal leader and ruler, by whom legislation is enacted, lest on account of a division of heads schism and division arise in the body of the republic, and with equal judges contradicting each other, if there be no supreme judge, litigation would never be resolved.
The celestial order also has this, that all spirits are most orderly arranged under the obedience of one supreme Spirit, whom they behold face to face.
Since therefore this lower hierarchy accords with the natural order and the moral and the celestial, because it perfects nature and adorns morals and emanates from the heavenly Jerusalem: hence it is that it must be reduced according to the principle of obedience to one first and supreme. For just as there is no order of priority and posteriority except through reduction to the first , so there is no complete order according to below and above except through reduction to the supreme. Whence there alone is the most perfect order, where there is perfect reduction to the supreme, which is the supreme absolutely, of which kind is God; and this is in the heavenly Jerusalem, where there is full justice. — But where there is reduction to the supreme in the genus of men, of which kind is the Vicar of Christ the Supreme Pontiff: there is a perfect order, insofar as befits the perfection of the present Church, which is formed after the likeness of the heavenly Jerusalem.
Hence Bernard, in the third book to Eugenius: "Do not consider this form, which is on earth, to be base: it has its form in heaven. He who said the following had seen this: I saw the holy city descending from heaven, prepared by God. For I consider it said on account of the likeness, that, just as there the Cherubim and Seraphim and all the rest down to the Archangels and Angels are ordered under one head, God: so here also under one Supreme Pontiff the primates or patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, priests or abbots and the rest are arranged in this manner. It is not to be made little of that it has God as its author and draws its origin from heaven." — Thus therefore there ought to be one to whom universal subjection is referred: and this because, as has been shown, the order of universal justice so required.
The unity of the Church itself also requires this. For since the Church itself is one hierarchy, one body and one bride; it is necessary that it have one preeminent hierarch, one head, and one bridegroom: and since this unity is not only in the Church according to the interior influence of charisms, but also according to the exterior dispensation of ministries: hence it is that the preeminent hierarch, head, and bridegroom of the Church itself is not only Jesus Christ Himself, who interiorly rules, vivifies, and makes fruitful the Church itself; but also exteriorly there ought to be one preeminent minister, holding the place of the first hierarch, the head, and the bridegroom, so that the Church may be preserved in unity not only interiorly, but also exteriorly.
And this is what Cyprian says, and it is found in Causa twenty-four, question one: "The Lord speaks to Peter: I say to you, that you are Peter, and upon this rock etc. Upon one He builds the Church, and the beginning proceeds from unity, so that the Church of Christ may be shown to be one: the episcopate is one, of which a part is held by each one in its entirety: and the Church is one, which extends more broadly in multitude the increase of its fruitfulness. As there are many rays, but one light, and the branches of a tree are many, but the strength is one, founded on a tenacious root: and as from one fountain many streams flow, and although the multiplicity may seem diffused by the bounty of overflowing abundance, yet unity is preserved whole in the origin: so also the Church of God, suffused with light, extends its rays through the whole world: yet it is one that is diffused everywhere, nor is the unity of the body separated." Cyprian therefore intends that because the Church is one dove, one episcopate, one body, it ought to have been founded upon one preeminent pastor, namely Peter, as upon one bishop and head and bridegroom. The solidity of both also requires this. For, as the Philosopher says, "power, the more it is united, the more it is infinite"; which is indeed true both with respect to permanence and with respect to influence and with respect to preeminence.
As to permanence: because, just as division begets destruction, so greater union gives firmness and strength, whence also the entire firmness of the Church itself principally flows from the solidity of the one Rock and of the one Peter, who is the Vicar of the Rock; as a sign of which thing it was said to Peter: And upon this rock I will build my Church; it was also said to him: I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not: nor was this prayer in vain. Whence Jerome, and it is found in Causa twenty-four, question one: "The Holy Roman Church, which has always remained immaculate, by the Lord's providence and by the blessed Apostle Peter bearing aid, shall in the future remain without any assault of heretics, and shall persist firm and immovable for all time." Therefore this unity of the Supreme Pontiff contributes to the solidity of the Church itself as to permanence.
Also as to influence: because power more united is more potent, and the more potent it is in efficacy, the more powerful is its influence in effect; whence the fullness of power ought to have been placed in one Pontiff alone. Whence Pope Leo, in Distinction nineteen: "The Lord willed that the sacrament of this office should pertain to the duty of all the Apostles in such a way that He placed it principally in the most blessed Peter, the supreme prince of all the Apostles, so that from him, as from a certain head, He might pour forth His gifts as into the whole body, so that whoever should dare to withdraw from the solidity of Peter might understand himself to be without share in the divine mystery." - Lastly, it also contributes as to preeminence: because power more united is less subject to another, and through this is more free; because also the more united it is, the more it holds the character of the first and the highest, just as the ark was completed in a cubit; whence the unity of the Supreme Pontiff alone is what confers upon the whole Church the preeminence of dignity. And through this, just as in the head, for the adornment of the whole body, the collection of all the senses is gathered together, so in the Supreme Pontiff himself there ought to be the collection of all dignities. And this is what Bernard says to Eugenius: "Let us inquire, come, let us inquire still more diligently, who you are, what person namely you bear for the time being in the Church of God. Who are you? The great Priest, the Supreme Pontiff; you are the prince of bishops, you the heir of the Apostles, you are Abel in primacy, Noah in governance, Abraham in patriarchate, Melchizedek in order, Aaron in dignity, Moses in authority, Samuel in judgment, Peter in power, Christ in anointing."
From these things, therefore, it is openly gathered that the unity of the Supreme Pontiff remains by the law of God, since the order of universal justice demands this, both natural and civil and also celestial; since also the unity of the Church demands this, as one hierarchy, one body, and one spouse; since also the stability and sublimity of both demands this, both in the permanence of duration and in the influence of power and in the preeminence of dignity. Whence, although this has flowed from the law of grace, which is the law of Jesus Christ, it nevertheless accords with the law of nature and the written law, with pontifical law and canon law: it accords with visible things, it accords with invisible things: it also accords with the piety of all the faithful and with the right understanding of all minds: just as the arguments set forth above also show, whence they are also to be granted.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that whoever wishes to be greater must be a servant, it must be said that servant is said in two ways: either by obligatory subjection, or by perfect humility. The first is repugnant to supreme authority, and no one can simultaneously be bound in subjection to others and preside over governance. The second, however, is not repugnant but most consonant: and it is of this that the Lord speaks, because He teaches the one supremely set over others to imitate Christ above all, who left to others an example of humility especially to be imitated: in sign of which the Supreme Pontiff also writes himself servant of the servants of God. Whence Bernard, in the second book to Eugenius, speaking of humility: "No more splendid gem in all the adornment especially of the Supreme Pontiff; for the more exalted he is above the rest, the more illustrious it appears, even beyond itself."
2. To that which is objected, that we ought not to call anyone father upon earth, it must be said that father means one who communicates nature, and master means one who communicates knowledge; and since God alone is He who principally bestows nature and infuses knowledge, therefore both names, namely of father and of master, ought to be attributed to Him as the principal source of both knowledge and nature, inasmuch as they denote principal authority, and not to another. But because God in these things also works outwardly through human ministry, therefore both names, insofar as they denote ministry, can be communicated to a human being, not as to a principal agent, but as to a steward.
3. 4. To that which is objected concerning Paul, that he was equal to Peter: it must be said that the authority of the apostolate has a twofold comparison, namely to him by whom it is conferred, and to those over whom it is conferred: because an apostle is called one sent by someone and to some persons. According to the first comparison, the Gloss says that Paul is made equal to Peter, because each was immediately sent by Christ. Whence Paul also says that he is an Apostle, not from man nor through man, but through Jesus Christ. But according to the second comparison, he is not made equal to him; for Peter is called the prince of the Apostles, which is never said of Paul, because according to this comparison he was inferior to Peter. Whence the Gloss also says there: "Peter himself furnished an example to posterity, so that the greater ones would not disdain, if perchance they had departed from the path of rectitude, to be corrected even by their inferiors."
And through this the following objection is clear, which he raises concerning the authority of Cyprian.
5. 6. To that which is objected, that that word was said to the Apostles which had previously been said to Peter: it must be said that it was said far differently to them and to Peter. For to Peter it was said separately and singularly, because in him the fullness of power was to be placed principally and singularly: but to the others it was said collectively; Whatsoever you shall bind, etc., because they were called "into a share of the solicitude." Whence although they had a similar power, they did not however have an equal one: and therefore that word had to be said to the Apostles and to Peter: not however at the same time nor under the same context, but in one way and another.
And through this the response to the following objection concerning the Gloss is clear; because the Apostles are said to have the same judiciary power, that is, a similar one: but from this it does not follow that they had an equal one, but it is a figure of speech from a change of the predicate, because similitude consists in quality, but equality in quantity .
7. To that which is objected from the authority of Jerome, that a bishop, wherever he may be, is of the same priesthood: it must be said that Jerome is speaking to the effect that the magnitude of riches and the multitude of subject people does not cause a man to be a more excellent prelate on that account; nor is the Pope said to be more excellent than others on account of his being the bishop of the City, which has the greatest population; but because he is the successor of Peter, upon whom was conferred the fullness of power, not by the statute of man, but of God and of Christ.
8. To that which is objected, that it is not necessary for all kings to obey one person, it must be said that the case is not similar, because the scepter of the king does not proceed from the statute of the evangelical law in the same way as the key of the Pontiff does. For the evangelical law is spiritual, whence Christ too, the bearer of that law, directed the eyes of His mind to the spiritual pontificate, not to carnal dominion. —Nevertheless, it could be said that in truth both powers converge in one person in the Supreme Pontiff. For since he himself is the high priest according to the order of Melchisedech, who was king of Salem and priest of the most high God, and Christ possessed both: the Vicar of Christ on earth received both powers from Christ, whence both swords belong to him. Whence Bernard, in the fourth book to Eugenius: "Both are of the Church, namely the spiritual sword and the material; but the latter indeed is to be drawn for the Church, the former by the Church; the former by the hand of the priest, the latter by the hand of the soldier, but assuredly at the nod of the priest and at the command of the emperor." From which it is openly gathered that both powers are traced back to him as to the one first and supreme hierarch.
9. To that which is objected, that whoever has ordinary power can commit it to another, it must be said that jurisdiction exists in a threefold distinction: one kind is semi-complete and wholly descending from another source, and this cannot be committed on account of its imperfection; another kind, on the contrary, is most full, and this, because it is supreme, cannot exist except in one person at one and the same time, and therefore it cannot be committed to another—whence the Pope cannot make other Popes; but there is a middle kind, which is ordinary, yet is not supreme: and this indeed, because it is in a certain way perfect and capable of being multiplied, can be committed to another; nor is it lost even when it is given, insofar as it is a spiritual power, because in this spiritual things differ from corporal things: that corporal things, when they are given, are possessed less wholly, but spiritual things, when they are distributed, are then possessed more fully, as is also manifestly seen in the gift of knowledge. Whence, although the Supreme Pontiff communicates jurisdiction to others, he does not on that account suffer any detriment, because he never so commits nor can commit it that he exempts anyone from his own power.