It accords also by reason of the divine statute, Leviticus 18. For the Lord established laws according to which legitimacy is observed in the persons who contract marriage. For He says: I am the Lord your God: keep my laws and judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them. No man
shall approach to her that is near of kin to him, etc. - Since therefore the Lord as a benefit promised that He would give offspring to Abraham through the way of marriage, and miraculously made fruitful the dead womb of Sarah, and also gave laws according to which marriage is to be contracted: it is evident that conjugal chastity accords with the written law.
It accords no less also with the law of grace, first indeed by reason of the angelic announcement, according to that passage of Luke 1: Fear not, Zechariah, for your prayer has been heard, and Elizabeth your wife shall bear you a son: now Zechariah had merited this through devout prayer and through a holy life chastely maintained in the law of marriage; whence it is said in Luke 1 that both were just before the Lord, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord, without blame.
Secondly, by reason of the Lord's definition, not only through the deed by which He was present at the wedding, but also through the word by which He authoritatively defined it, Matthew 19: What God has joined together, let not man separate.
Thirdly, it also accords by reason of apostolic instruction. For Peter and Paul, the principal organizers of the Church, both commend marriage and its law and the fidelity of the marriage bed and the payment of the debt and the mutual love of wife and husband.
Since, therefore, conjugal chastity is approved both by the apostolic mouth and by the evangelical word and by the angelic mouth and by the divine mouth: and it is also approved by nature, which is the implanted law, and by Scripture or the Mosaic law, and by the evangelical law: it is manifest that it accords with the divine law and is to be approved according to it. And it is a wonder how the perfidy of heretics is so mad as to condemn conjugal chastity that has been approved by so many irrefutable testimonies.
Whence Augustine, in On Ecclesiastical Dogmas: "To call marriages evil, or to be compared to fornication or to debauchery, and to believe foods to be evil—this is not of Christians, but of Manichaeans."
But this must be noted: that although marriage itself is to be approved in every state and time, nevertheless in the first state, namely of instituted nature, it existed as a Sacrament and a duty; but after man's fall, by reason of nature it existed as a duty, but by reason of the disease it existed as a remedy. For because it is a Sacrament, it is rather a remediation of the disease itself than something infected by the disease; whence it now holds the character of a duty, a remedy, and a Sacrament. And according to this it must be understood that the use of conjugal chastity can take place in two ways: either insofar as one has an eye toward the duty of procreating offspring for the worship of God, and thus it is an act of pure virtue by reason of its root, by reason of its mode, and by reason of its end; or insofar as one has an eye also toward the remedy, so that the vice of incontinence may be avoided, and thus it is an act of virtue that the weakness of the flesh accompanies. But if one has an eye toward the disease, that is, toward satiating concupiscence: either one in some way regards the remedy or the duty, and then it is not an act of virtue, but a venial sin, because it is excused through the Sacrament of marriage; or one in no way has an eye except toward satiating the appetite of concupiscence, by which one is carried with such great impulse that even if she were not his wife, he would know her: and then, because that act perverts the law of marriage, it is not an act consonant with chastity, but repugnant to it.
Whence Augustine, in the book On the Good of Marriage: "That intercourse alone is blameless which is conjugal, undertaken for the necessity of begetting; but that which goes beyond this necessity yields not to reason but to lust: and yet not to demand but to render this to one's spouse, lest by fornicating one sin damnably, pertains to the conjugal person. But if both are subjected to such concupiscence, they do something not properly of marriage; nevertheless, if in their union they love more what is honorable than what is dishonorable, that is, what belongs to marriage rather than what does not belong to marriage, this is conceded to them, on the authority of the Apostle, by way of pardon. For so great is the force of the Creator's ordinance and the order of creation that in things granted for use, even when the measure is exceeded, it is far more tolerable than even one or rare excesses in those things which have not been granted."
From these things, therefore, it is clear that conjugal continence and its due use is approvable according to the law of God. Whence also the arguments which are adduced for this position are to be granted.
1. To that which is first objected to the contrary concerning the children of this world, it must be said that the children of the world are sometimes distinguished from the children of light, as in Luke 16: The children of this world are more prudent than the children of light, etc.; sometimes they are distinguished from the children of the other world or of the resurrection, as here. In the first way, the children of this world are called those who conform themselves to this world and love it above all: and thus it has the sense of vice. In the second way, the children of this world are called those who live in this world, or pass away with the world; and thus it has the sense of infirmity. Whence from this it is not established that marriage is blameworthy, but that it has an infirmity attached to it.
2. 3. To that which is objected, that those who are in the flesh cannot please God, it must be said that to be in the flesh can denote a relation of matter or of end; insofar as it denotes a relation of matter, it is not reprehensible to be in the flesh, and thus it accords with conjugal chastity and its use; insofar as it denotes a relation of end, as when someone performs carnal works for the sake of the flesh, thus it is culpable: and in this way the Apostle understands it, and in this way it does not arise from conjugal chastity, but rather is against it. Whence Augustine, in the book On the Good of Marriage: "Marriages have this good, that carnal or youthful incontinence, even if it is vicious, is directed to the honorableness of propagating offspring, so that from the evil of lust the conjugal union may produce something good; then, because carnal concupiscence is restrained and in a certain way burns more modestly, being tempered by parental affection. For a certain gravity intervenes in fervent pleasure, when in the very act by which man and woman cleave to one another, they nevertheless consider becoming father and mother."
From which it is gathered that marriage is of such great power that it directs the carnal act to spiritual honorableness.
And through this the response to what follows is clear concerning what is objected from that text: He who sows in the flesh etc.
4. To that objection, that he who has a wife is anxious etc.: it must be said that solicitude is twofold: one kind is under God, and this is called distracting and occupying solicitude; the other kind leads to forgetfulness of God, and this is suffocating solicitude: similarly a distinction must be made concerning friendship as well. The Apostle, however, speaks of the first kind, and the argument proceeds from the second.
5. To that objection that those who have wives ought to be as though not using them: it must be said that the Apostle does not there prohibit every use of worldly things; for then it would be necessary for man to go out of the world, and thus no one in this world would be just and good; but he shows there that one's intention must not be fixed on this world, nor should it be loved as an end, but as a way to the end. This is clear from what he adds: For the figure of this world passes away . Hence from this it is not established that one should not use a wife, but that one should not rest in love of her and use of her, since she is not a stable good, but one transitory and perishable.
6. To that objection that the act of marriage is by way of indulgence: it must be said that this is not said of marriage itself and of the nuptial act that is performed for the procreation of children, but of that which is performed for the restraining of incontinence, because this has venial fault joined to it, as was said above. Hence Augustine, in the book On the Good of Marriage: "If you have taken a wife, you have not sinned: and if a virgin marries, she does not sin. From this it is no longer permissible to doubt that marriage is not a sin; therefore the Apostle does not grant marriage by way of pardon. For who would hesitate to say that it is most absurd to say that those to whom pardon is given have not sinned? But he grants that intercourse by way of pardon which takes place on account of incontinence, not solely for the sake of procreating, but also sometimes with no purpose of procreating; which marriage does not compel to happen, but obtains pardon for, provided however that it is not so excessive as to impede the times that ought to be set aside for prayer, nor changed into that use which is against nature".
7. To that objection that everything is evil to which sin necessarily follows: it must be said that this is true, speaking per se; but in the generation of offspring it must be noted that two things concur, namely the conjugal act and concupiscence, and they are distinguished from one another; because if man had remained upright, the act of marriage would have been without concupiscence; original sin therefore does not follow upon the conjugal act by reason of itself, but by reason of the concupiscence annexed to it; and therefore from this it does not follow that the act itself is evil, but that concupiscence is evil. And this is what Augustine says Against Julian: "It is not propagation that transmits original sin to posterity, but concupiscence".
8. To that which is objected, that every act which evil necessarily accompanies is blameworthy: it must be said that lust accompanies the act of conjugal chastity as punishment, but does not accompany it as fault: because the good of matrimony brings it about that that lust is ordered to a good, namely to the procreation of children; and through this very thing one uses the evil well and rather excuses the evil than is vitiated by the evil: because, as has been said, it has in itself the power of a divinely instituted remedy. Whence Augustine, in the third book against Julian: "Why are you unwilling to agree that lust is an evil, of which the married make good use for the sake of begetting? Or can there be an evil use of good things, and there cannot be a good use of evil things, when we find how well the Apostle used Satan himself, handing over a man to him for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit might be saved "?
9. To that which is objected, that no act about which one reasonably feels shame is an act of virtue: it must be said that a person does not feel shame about the conjugal act by reason of the act, but by reason of the vitiated punishment, namely lust, which from the vice of the first parent draws its origin, which in the vice of original sin confers origin, which also to the spirit itself is in a certain way rebellious. But about the conjugal act itself one feels no shame at all: which is evident, because one is not confounded but glories in this, that he has procreated children according to the law of matrimony, which restrained that lust and gave to that act a limit and measure and due end. Whence Augustine, in the fourth book against Julian: "Who among us says that the union of the conjugal members is evil, in which marriage uses well the evil of concupiscence for the propagation of children? Which concupiscence would not be an evil if it were moved solely for the sake of begetting to licit intercourse: but now, since conjugal chastity resists it, it is the boundary of evil, because it is a matter of no crime, because through the good of fidelity a person uses the evil of lust."
10. To that which is objected, that every motion alienating from God, etc.: it must be said that something is said to alienate from God in two ways: either simply, or with respect to some act or state. In the first way it cannot be without sin: in the second way it can be through the punishment of sin and also through an act of virtue: just as the exercise of action retards and for a time impedes the act of contemplation, just as also sleep impedes the exercise in virtue.
11. To the objection that no act in which reason is absorbed is an act of virtue: it can be said that reason is said to be absorbed in two ways in any act: either antecedently, or consequently. If antecedently, as is the case in drunkenness, because the drunkard knowingly procures something by which he overturns the use of reason in himself, then the objection has truth; but if consequently or even concomitantly, then it does not have truth. For even in sleep reason is absorbed. Whence Augustine, Against Julian: "You could not have more gravely accused lust than by confessing that in its impulse no one can think holy thoughts; but surely the religious soul, making good use of this evil, thinks this: that it should endure lust in lying together, which it cannot think about when it endures it—just as a man thinks of health so that he might give himself over to sleep, which indeed he cannot think about when he sleeps."
12. To the objection that no act which is repugnant to spiritual delight is a motion of virtue: it must be said that some act can be repugnant to spiritual delight in two ways: either by reason of rest itself, or by reason of order. For spiritual delight is ordered rest. That which is repugnant to it by reason of order, is vicious; but that which is repugnant by reason of rest for a time need not be a vice, as was shown above.
Furthermore, the conjugal act is not repugnant to that delight by reason of itself, but by reason of what is annexed to it.
13. To the objection that every act of virtue consists in a mean: it must be said that although in the conjugal act there seems to be excessive delight in comparison to the impulse of sensuality, it is nevertheless moderated in comparison to the governance of reason, which considers the due time, the due place, the due matter, the due end, and also the due manner; whence that excessive delight is not an act of virtue, but its moderation by reason is an act of conjugal chastity. Whence Augustine, in the fourth book Against Julian: "You ask whether in Christian spouses I should call the pleasure of their unions chastity, or unchastity? Behold, I respond: it is not itself called chastity, but the good use of that evil, by which good use it comes about that that evil cannot even be called unchastity: for unchastity is the shameful use of that same evil, just as virginal chastity is no use of that same evil."