The Lantern

De Perfectione Evangelica · Question 13

CCEL

It is nevertheless the dwelling place of grace. For grace makes a man pleasing to God: but he is pleasing to God who recognizes the gift of divine favor and condescension: yet no one recognizes this except one who is attentive to his own unworthiness: and such a one is truly humble: and hence it is that the grace of the Holy Spirit rests upon the humble alone.

Whence in the last chapter of Isaiah: Upon whom does My Spirit rest if not upon the humble etc.; Augustine, in the third book of On Christian Doctrine: "For this reason the sins of great men were written down, so that that apostolic saying might everywhere be feared: Wherefore let him who seems to stand take heed lest he fall. For there is no page of the holy books in which it does not resound: God resists the proud, but to the humble He gives grace ."

Because, therefore, humility is the dwelling-place of grace, hence it is that in it consists the summit of all evangelical perfection. And this is what Augustine says to Dioscorus: "You will find no other way for yourself to seize and obtain the truth than that which was found by Him who, as God, sees the weakness of our steps. Now the first is humility, the second humility, the third humility; and as often as you might ask, I would say this, not that there are not other precepts which may be spoken of, but unless humility has both preceded and accompanied and followed all things whatsoever that we do well, and been set before us that we may gaze upon it, and placed beside us that we may cling to it, and imposed upon us that we may be restrained: already, while we rejoice over some good deed, pride wrests the whole thing from our hand. And so, if you were to ask, and as often as you might ask, about the precepts of the Christian religion, I would choose to respond with nothing other than humility: and if I were to speak of other things beyond this, necessity would compel it."

Now the act of this kind of humility is not only interior, but also exterior humiliation and self-abasement. And the reason for this is: because, since being is twofold, namely of nature and of grace, nothingness is twofold: in one way by opposition to the being of nature, in another way by opposition to the being of morals and grace. And accordingly, humility, which exists through the consideration of, or which is contemplative of, our nothingness, is twofold: one indeed may be called the humility of truth, which arises from the consideration of nothingness by opposition to the being of nature; and this is found not only in human beings, but also in the Angels, not only in wayfarers, but also in the Blessed. The other may be called the humility of severity, which arises from the consideration of fault; by which, when a man through pride considers himself to have been plunged down, he rises up against himself by a certain severe censure through humility, abasing himself not only inwardly in his own eyes, but also outwardly in the eyes of others. Whence self-abasement, not only exterior but also interior, is an act of the virtue of humility, nonetheless consonant with evangelical perfection, if there be attended to in it the due origin and manner and fruit.

For in its origin exterior humiliation ought to proceed from interior humility according to the dictate and rule of the divine gift; and this can be done according to the law of divine precept, or of divine good pleasure, or of divine counsel. Precept regards all universally: good pleasure regards those to whom the divine will is specially inspired: counsel indeed regards those who ascend to the summit of perfection. And concerning these three it is said to the Romans: that you may prove what is the good, well-pleasing, and perfect will of God. Rightly therefore does he humble himself who conforms himself to the divine will according to any one of these three modes, according to which the spirit of true humility inclines different persons to different kinds of humiliations.

The manner of exterior humiliation, however, is that there be preserved in it manliness, truth, and propriety; manliness against pusillanimity, which casts down the spirit; truth against hypocrisy, which deceives men; propriety against foolishness, which dishonors men and makes them play the fool.

The fruit of this humiliation, however, is that it avails for acquiring humility, for exercising it, and for perfecting it. Whence, on that passage in John thirteen: And you ought to wash one another's feet — the Gloss says: "He who bows down at the feet, in his heart humility is stirred up; or if it already exists in the heart, the disposition of humility is confirmed." And Bernard, in a certain letter to Ogerius: "Humility, to which humiliation assuredly leads, is the foundation of the entire spiritual edifice; since humiliation is the way to humility, just as patience is to peace, just as reading is to knowledge. If you desire the virtue of humility, do not flee from the way of humiliation; for if you cannot be humiliated, you will not be able to advance to humility." This humiliation, moreover, he calls the vilification of oneself; whence he also adds: " I will play and become yet more vile, I will play, that is, so that I may be mocked. A good game, at which Michal grows angry, but God is delighted; a good game, which provides a laughingstock indeed to men, but a spectacle to the Angels; a good game, I say, in which we are made a reproach to the affluent and a contempt to the proud. With this chaste and devout game he was playing who said: We are made a spectacle to this world and to Angels and to men. With this game let us also play in the meantime, that we may be mocked and confounded and humbled, until he comes who casts down the mighty and exalts the humble, who will make us glad, exalt us, and glorify us for eternity."

From these things it is manifestly gathered that to humble and vilify oneself for Christ is a work of perfect virtue and consonant with Christian religious life and perfection. Whence the arguments and authorities that are adduced for this position are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected, that virtue is consonant with nature, and nature always desires to be advanced: it must be said that although according to the outward appearance, the act of humility, which is the vilification of oneself, seems to be dissonant from the instinct of nature, yet according to truth and its intrinsic rationale it is most consonant with nature itself, both with respect to its origin and with respect to its conservation, and also with respect to its advancement. For every nature, from the fact that it is from nothing, has some defect in itself and proclaims itself to be defective.

Nature is also preserved in this, that it maintains unity in its component principles and also in its quantitative parts according to its powers: also in this, that it expels everything that induces dispersion, as far as is possible for it. - Moreover, it advances in this, that it desires to receive influence from a higher nature, to which it subjects itself, so that it may be perfected by it. Since, therefore, it belongs to humility to recognize one's own deficiency, to reduce oneself to a certain unitive smallness, to repel from oneself the spirit of self-exaltation and pride as something dispersive, to subject and offer oneself to the influence of supernal grace: hence it is that humility in truth accords with the act and instinct of nature. Whence that argument assumes something false when it says that humility is discordant with the instinct of nature and that its act is to abase oneself. - It could also be said otherwise, that that definition belongs to moral virtue, which is rooted in the natural dictate. But this act of humility is founded in the faith of Jesus Christ, which is an act above reason and exceeds the limits of nature. And therefore that argument does not hold.

2. To the objection that virtue is the ordering of love, it must be said that the ordering of love which is considered in virtue principally, radically, and essentially regards this, that God be preferred to the creature; and every other ordering is annexed to and, as it were, directs toward this ordering as toward the principal ordering. Since therefore, as Augustine says, in order that the Creator may become sweet in the heart, it is fitting that the creature become vile; and because that creature which most obstructs this ordering is one's own person and private good: therefore, for preserving the perfect ordering of virtue, it is most fitting that one abase oneself; which one does when one subjects oneself to another for the sake of God and places another before oneself, while preserving, however, the dignity of the ecclesiastical order, which true humility does not pervert nor neglect nor set aside, but rather preserves, while inwardly humility is maintained in the heart, and outwardly authority endures in its proper degree.

3. To the objection that virtue is a habit consisting in a mean, it must be said that this statement is understood not of a mean with respect to quantity on the part of the object, but with respect to distance from the deficiency and excess that have the character of vice, and thus the abasement of self is the work of virtue standing as a mean between pusillanimity and arrogance. Whence, although it may seem to incline toward an extreme, in truth it nevertheless holds the mean.

Moreover, as has been touched upon, the abasement of self is not only an act of virtue informing nature, but also an example of virtue repairing it; whence it holds more the character of a remedy than of a perfection; and because the disease corrupting the human race is above all the haughtiness of pride and arrogance, and the remedy must be by way of the contrary: therefore, by inclining toward the other extreme, it leads back to the mean: as can be seen by a similar example in the strictness of fasting and abstinence against the disease of licentiousness.

4. To that objection, that every virtue has a foundation of truth: it must be said that this is true and has its place in humility, because the very truth of the divine law dictates that each person ought to think more humbly of himself than of another. Whence, just as each person naturally feels his own afflictive ailment more than another's, so each person ought to reconsider his own defect more certainly, more closely, and more frequently, and on this account ought to regard himself as more vile than others—not because he is certain that he is such, but because he is more certain of his own vanity or vileness than of another's. Therefore, as is said in the Gloss on Philippians 2: In humility esteeming one another as superior to themselves, "we ought not so to esteem this that we pretend to esteem it, but truly esteem that there can be something hidden in another by which he is superior to us, even if our own good, by which we seem superior to him, is not hidden." And thus it is apparent that self-abasement is not founded upon falsehood but upon truth, namely according to experiential knowledge of one's own defect, which each person has, as it were, singularly with respect to another—just as each just person has some singular excellence with respect to another, by reason of which in the praise of any Confessor it is said: There was none found like unto him.

5. To that objection: he who abases what was made; it must be said that the creature, because it was made by God from nothing and was vitiated in the first man by original sin, has in itself something of deiformity by reason of Him from whom it is, and something of defectibility by reason of that from which it is, and something of deformity by reason of the vice under which it is: and just as by reason of deiformity it is to be honored, because there shines forth in it the vestige, image, and likeness of God, so by reason of defectibility it can be held of little account, and by reason of deformity regarded as vile—not to the dishonor but to the honor of God, since honor is taken away only through the deformity of vice and sin.

6. To that objection, that man is the noblest creature: it must be said that by the reason whereby he has in himself the deiformity of the image, he is placed before the rest; but by the reason whereby he has defectibility and nothingness, he is made equal to others; yet because he has the deformity of viciousness, he is placed after the rest: whence the impious are most fittingly placed in hell by reason of sin, and by reason of this, self-abasement befits the sinner, which, when it is voluntary, has the character of virtue and of remedy.

7. To that objection, that to abase another is a sin: it must be said that to abase another is to place oneself before another, but to abase oneself is to subject oneself to another: and the first belongs to pride, the second to humility and reverence; and therefore the case is not similar on both sides.

8. To the objection that he who wishes to be considered vile by another wishes that the other sin: it must be said that this argument fails in two ways. First, because a suffering can be good even though the action is evil, as is clear in the Passion of Christ, in which there was merit on the part of Christ who endured, and demerit on the part of the crucifier; and therefore it does not follow that if someone wishes to suffer something in which another sins, that on this account he wishes the other to sin.

Furthermore, when someone wishes to be considered vile, he does not wish this by reason of nature or person, but by reason of fault against nature; and he who despises or hates that fault, whether in himself or in another, can do this meritoriously and without sin.

9. To the objection that the soul naturally desires to be conformed to God: it must be said that certain things are proper to divine excellence, such as divine judgment and vengeance, honor, etc.; and in such things he who desires to be conformed desires in a disordered manner, as Lucifer did. But certain things are such as He communicates to the creature, such as goodness, truth, and virtue, which is shown most greatly when one can master oneself; and therefore it does not follow that self-vilification is repugnant to the image of God.

10. To the objection that three things are desirable, namely the true, the good, and the arduous: it must be said that just as virtue is concerned with the true good, and vice with the apparent good: so pride regards arduousness that is apparent, which is very difficult and arduous to despise; but humility is the vilification of self, which includes true arduousness, although it is repugnant to the apparent. — Furthermore, no one truly humble vilifies himself except for this reason: that he wishes to be eternally exalted.

11. 12. To the objection that every virtue has its exemplar in God: it must be said that humility, with respect to what pertains to its completeness, namely not to exceed one's own limits, has its exemplar in God; but with respect to what regards defect and subjection to another, it does not have its exemplar in God, who has no defect and has no superior. Nevertheless, lest man on account of the lack of an exemplar should neglect to humble himself, it pleased God to assume the form of a servant and in that form to be humbled, despised, and vilified, so that others might be inflamed by so great an exemplar to the perfect vilification of self.

13. 14. To the objection about exterior humiliation, that it is a sign of interior humiliation: it must be said that such humiliation is not a sign of humility already acquired, but of the will to exercise oneself in acquiring humility; and this indeed ought to be and is in every good person who bears religion in his heart.

And through this the response to the following objection is clear, because through this a person neither says, nor boasts, nor displays that he is humble, but that he wishes to acquire and possess humility.

15. To the last objection, that every part which does not befit the whole is base, etc.: it must be said that, as Augustine says, "if all things were equal, not all things would exist." And therefore order, distinction, and multiplicity in professions and habits does not disfigure but adorns the whole of the Church; whence, just as one who would not wish these small creatures to exist in the universe would be an assailant of the totality of the world, so one who would wish to uproot from the Church vile and abject habits is an assailant of the universal Church.