And on account of this, Rachel, who signifies the contemplative life, is interpreted as the seen principle, because whoever sees it insofar as it is the first principle has the terminus of his condition and his desire fulfilled; which will not be fulfilled unless the first principle is clearly seen, where it is both triune and supremely one.
And those arguments which are brought forward for this position are to be granted.
1.2. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that primacy with respect to essence excludes plurality: it must be said that the case is not similar, because multiple essences essentially differing cannot have an order to one another except according to the notion of prior and posterior; but multiple persons, because they have one essence and one being, can be ordered to one another in such a way that, although there is in them a relation of origin, there is nevertheless no intervention of posteriority; and therefore this plurality does not remove supreme primacy, because it includes no posteriority, which directly opposes primacy.
And through this the response to the following objection, which is raised concerning causality, is clear: because the order of causes through essential diversity is considered according to the comparison of the posterior to the first, which indeed is not to be found in the origin of the persons.
3. To that which is objected, that active production does not befit the last: it must be said that the case is not similar, because, since the last cannot have a relation that is identical with itself, nor is anything produced that is in all respects equal to it on account of its imperfection, therefore in it there is a necessary repugnance between being last and being productive, because something would stand after it as posterior. But it is otherwise on the part of the principle, because on account of the supreme completeness both in the one producing and in the one produced, active and passive production are not repugnant, with no posteriority intervening through which the completeness of perfect unity would be diminished.
4. To that which is objected, that they are either equally first or not: it must be said that first denotes the privation of an anterior in one way; in another way it denotes the privation of origin. If therefore first is said through the privation of an anterior, then they are equally first, because there is nothing there before and after. But if first is said through the privation of origin, namely because it originates from no one: then the notion of primacy principally resides in the person of the Father, by reason of which there is in him a fontal plenitude for the production of all persons. Whence also, because innascibility includes this property, it is therefore said to be a property which is a notion of the Father; which indeed would not be so unless it simultaneously expressed both nobility and a ground of being made known, and were also said relatively.
5. To that which is objected, that they are either equally principiating or not: it must be said that they are equally principiating essentially, but not equally personally, because the Father is the principle of two, the Son of one, and the Holy Spirit of none. Since therefore the notion of primacy, which belongs essentially to the first principle, is equally in all those three persons, therefore the Trinity stands together with supreme primacy: because, just as not being able to generate in the Son does not posit impotence, so not being from himself but from the Father does not posit any posteriority, and through this does not diminish the notion of perfect primacy.
6. To that which is objected, that unity is prior in reality and in understanding to plurality: it must be said that this is true of that plurality which is from the aggregation of unities; but of that plurality in which the same unity belongs to the three, it does not hold true, because in them there is one truth, one light, one ground of understanding on the part of God himself as understood. But that we understand unity before trinity, this is on account of the deficiency of understanding on our part.
7. To that which is objected, that the more fontal something is, the more prior it is in producing: it must be said that, as has already been touched upon, first, according as it is taken in two ways, both through the privation of essential anteriority and the privation of personal origin, thus includes a twofold fontality, according as it denotes the privation of essential anteriority and the privation of personal origin . According as it denotes the privation of essential anteriority, it thus includes fontality with respect to effects and essences to be produced; and thus, since this condition belongs equally to all persons, the notion of fontality equally belongs to them in the production of the being of creatures, because they are not three but one principle of creation. But according as it denotes the privation of personal origin, thus it belongs to the innascible person alone, namely the Father, in whom is the plenitude of fontality for the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit.
This fountainhead, however, is in a certain way the origin of another totality. For since the Father produces the Son, and through the Son and with the Son produces the Holy Spirit, therefore God the Father, through the Son with the Holy Spirit, is the principle of all created things: for unless He produced them from eternity, He could not produce through them in time: and therefore by reason of that production in the Trinity He is rightly said to be the fountain of life . For just as He has life in Himself, so He gives the Son to have life in Himself etc. Hence it is that eternal life is this alone, that the rational spirit, which flows from the most blessed Trinity and is the image of the Trinity, returns by way of a certain intelligible circle through memory, understanding, and will, through the deiformity of glory into the most blessed Trinity.