Hence the arguments that are on this side must be conceded.
1. To that, therefore, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is generation, there is change: it must be said that this is true in creatures, where generation is the passage from being in potency to being in act, where also consequently there is change, because what is generated is disposed otherwise now than before. But it is otherwise in the divine, because there the generation is one of every manner of actuality, both on the part of the principle and the terminus and the production itself and that from which the production occurs. Hence because there is no acquisition of new being there, and yet there is a reception of true and actual and sempiternal being; therefore, although there is true production, there is nevertheless no true change there.
2. To that which is objected, that generation implies change and relation: it must be said that those things which are in creatures, if they are posited in the Creator, ought to be posited according to that which they have of completeness, not according to that which they have of incompleteness. Motion and change always imply incompleteness, but relation implies in most cases a complement, especially that relation which signifies origin among the most noble things without any dependence: and in this manner in that eternal production.
3. To that which is objected, that corruption cannot be understood without change: it must be said that it is not similar, because corruption denotes the loss of being, which indeed cannot be understood unless it comes after being previously possessed; and on this account it necessarily includes change, which can only exist in a thing that is mutable and variable on account of the defect that it denotes. But generation is the giving or receiving of being through consubstantiality; and this can pertain to the most noble and most actual being, because it denotes no defect, and on this account it does not necessarily include change, as corruption does. For corruption is not opposed to such generation, but only to that which exists in a creature, which indeed corruption in a certain way follows and in a certain way precedes. "For the generation of one thing is the corruption of another," as the Philosopher says.
4. To that which is objected, that generation in time posits change in time, and therefore generation in eternity implies change in eternity: it must be said that that mode of inference holds where there is no qualifying determination that draws apart; but it is not so in the present case, because generation in eternity is of a different mode than generation in time, as has been said: it does not come about from a being in potency, as does that which is measured by time. And therefore it does not follow that if motion accompanies the latter, it also accompanies the former; indeed, rather the opposite follows.
5. To that which is objected, that if the Holy Spirit were generated, He would be changed: it must be said that that argument follows, not because to be generated is to be changed, but because, when what need not be is posited, what need not be results. For if it is posited that the Holy Spirit, who receives being through spiration, which really differs from generation, were to receive being by way of generation, it is necessarily posited that He would pass from one mode of emanating to another really different mode; and thus it is necessarily posited that He would be changed, not because those modes of originating or emanating denote motions or changes, but because the transition from one to another cannot be understood without motion. And since change is not admitted in the divine being, hence it is that it is impossible for the person who is produced through spiration to be generated. And hence it is that although the Father generates and spirates, He is nevertheless not changed, because these two stand simultaneously with respect to the person of the Father, namely to spirate and to generate, nor is it necessary to pass from one to the other. But these two modes cannot simultaneously belong to the same produced person; and on this account, if per impossibile it is understood to be posited with respect to any of those persons, by the same impossibility motion is also posited, because the mode of being produced is posited to vary.
6. To that which is objected, namely that production in the divine is either by necessity or by will: it must be said that, as will appear more clearly in the question concerning necessity, there it is in a certain way by necessity and in a certain way by will. For it is not by the necessity of coaction, but of immutability: not by a will that chooses, but by a will sempiternally accepting, according to which the one producing is well-pleased with himself in the most noble production and is also delighted. And therefore it does not follow that there can be there any variation of mutability or restriction of power, because at once he who is produced is produced necessarily, freely, and powerfully.
7. To that which is objected, that the immutability of a creature excludes generation, as is evident in the Angel, and therefore also in God; it must be said that this does not hold, because a creature in generating cannot give its whole substance, on account of the fact that it falls short of supreme simplicity and actuality and communicability; therefore it is impossible that anything be generated from its substance without it being changed. But it is otherwise in the matter at hand, as has been said above, because the one generating in the divine does not give to the one generated a part of his essence, but gives the whole essence, most simple and perfect.
It could nevertheless be said that even a spiritual creature has an intrinsic generation, which indeed is that of the word from the mind, which among all created things most fully bears the likeness of eternal generation.
8. To that which is objected, that the cause of generation and corruption is to be far distant from the First: it must be said that this is not the whole reason. For man, if he had remained in the state of innocence, would never have been corrupted, and yet he would have generated. Whence generation is rather from the supreme perfection and fecundity and actuality of the first principle itself, than it is for the supplementing of the defect of corruption of the productive principle itself. Therefore the Philosopher speaks of the cause of generation according to the state of deficient nature, not generally and according to the mode of that most complete generation, which is the origin of all production. For the generator of the species constituted all these things, and he himself, who bestows generation upon others, cannot be sterile, according to what is said in the last chapter of Isaiah.
9. To that which is objected, that God cannot produce something from any creature without the alteration of that creature: it must be said that it is not similar: because, since a creature is mutable and not altogether simple, when something is posited to be produced from it, it is posited consequently to be altered, because that which is given and that which is received and the intermediate act cannot be the same there through every manner of indifference: but in the divine it is altogether the opposite, as is manifestly clear from the preceding.
10. To that which is objected, that nothing can be produced from nothing without change: it must be said that this is not analogous, because nothing can be produced from nothing without having being after non-being, and without also having being from a principle that is essentially different. Whence, although nothing is not mutable of itself, nevertheless the eduction by which something that previously was not a being is made a being necessarily posits inception and change. But this is not so regarding that production by which a person is produced from the eternal substance of the eternally producing person, because there neither is another being received anew, nor does anything begin, and consequently neither is anything altered.
11. To that which is objected, that a form cannot be produced without change, therefore neither can a supposit: it must be said that this is not analogous, because the production of a form implies a substantial difference between the producer and the product; for nothing produces itself. And therefore, when a form is produced, it is necessary that it be produced by another form, which, since it is other than it, will truly be the producing cause and naturally prior to the produced form itself; and therefore in that production it is necessary that change be included. But this is not so in the production of a supposit or person, for the reason that there is one nature and essence in both, and therefore they are simultaneous; nor is there change or motion, because there is neither prior nor posterior nor anything new.
12. To that which is objected, that as part is related to part, so whole is related to whole: it must be said that in the divine persons there is properly neither part nor whole, according as whole is said of that which contains part and part. Nor does it follow that, if a thing produced from a part posits change in the part, similarly a thing produced from the whole substance would posit change with respect to the whole; because, as was touched upon before, production from a part posits a cutting off, posits the loss of something and the acquisition of something, which necessarily include change. But production from the whole substance implies nothing of this sort; rather, it excludes everything upon which motion follows, as was shown in the principal solution. For neither is there a cutting off in the producing principle, nor composition in the product, nor innovation in the production, nor any variation regarding any of the aforesaid.