Whether unity of nature can stand simultaneously with a trinity of persons.
Supposing that the divine being is supremely one, it is consequently asked whether unity of nature can stand simultaneously with a trinity of persons. And that they are incompossible is shown as follows.
1. That which is one in both form and supposit is more one than that which is one in only one of these: therefore if the divine being is one in form and not in hypostasis, it seems that it is not supremely one.
2. Likewise, that which is one in both substance and property is more one than that which is one in only one of these: but trinity cannot stand without a plurality of properties: therefore it necessarily diminishes from the notion of the one: therefore these two cannot stand together.
3. Likewise, something is the more one, the more it is undivided, by the definition of the one: therefore in the supremely one there is indivision in every way, therefore also indistinction in every way, therefore no plurality: therefore either there is no trinity there, or there is no supreme unity there.
4. Likewise, that which is one both in reality and in notion is more one than that which is one only in reality: but the trinity of persons cannot stand with unity of notion: therefore something diminishes from the perfection of supreme unity, therefore they cannot stand together.
5. Likewise, it is a rule that "whatever things are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other," if that one thing is absolutely one: therefore either the divine substance is not supremely one, and the persons do not share in it: or one person does not differ from another: but given either of these, trinity and unity are incompatible.
6. Likewise, it is a rule that when things are so related that one is formally predicated of the other, when one is multiplied, the other is also multiplied, as is clear in the case of man and animal, and whiteness and color; but formally a person is an essence: therefore if there are many persons, there are also many essences; and thus the same conclusion as before returns.
7. Likewise, the syllogistic form does not fail in propositions that are true per se, in which no accident is to be found; but these propositions are true per se: every person is distinguished, every person is an essence: therefore the essence is distinguished, therefore it is numbered, therefore it is not one in the trinity of persons.
8. Likewise, it is a rule that when the thing defined is multiplied, the definition and the defining elements are multiplied; but substance and nature fall within the definition of person: therefore if there are many persons, there are also many essences, substances, and natures: therefore the plurality of persons cannot be compatible with supreme unity regarding the divine nature.
9. Likewise, person is said either according to substance, or according to relation. If according to relation: then to say many persons would be the same as saying many relations: if according to substance: then the multiplication of person is a multiplication of substance and nature: therefore unity in nature is incompatible with trinity in persons.
10. Likewise, when I say: person is one, essence is one: either by the same unity, or by another. If by another: then there are many unities, and therefore not supremely one: if by the same: then if one is multiplied, so is the other: and if one is not multiplied, neither is the other: therefore trinity and supreme unity are incompatible.
11. Again, production does not belong to a person except by reason of nature; but there is no plurality in the divine except by reason of production: therefore if production plurifies the person, it will equally plurify the nature: therefore plurality here cannot stand together with the supreme unity of nature.
12. Again, the supreme simplicity of God excludes composition not only in nature, but also in person: therefore since unity relates to plurality as simplicity relates to composition, if there is supreme unity in the divine nature, there cannot be plurality, neither in nature nor in person.
13. Again, either in the divine being there is no distinction, or there is the most perfect distinction: but the most perfect distinction is that which is considered according to form: since therefore this cannot stand together with supreme unity, it remains that either there is not supreme unity there, or there is not plurality there.
14. Again, unity and truth reflect upon themselves, to whatever nature they are attributed: if therefore in the divine there is true plurality, then there is plurified truth there, therefore multiple truths, and consequently multiple entities: therefore not true unity; and thus the same conclusion returns as before.
15. Again, that the Father generates, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds are two true things, if there is a trinity in the divine, therefore two truths: therefore if a plurality of truths is repugnant to supreme unity, it remains that so also is a plurality of persons.
16. Again, in that trinity there is either a repetition of the same unity, or of another. If of the same : then there is no plurality according to reality, therefore it is a nugation and superfluity; if of another: then since the multiplication and aggregation of diverse unities is repugnant to supreme unity, the conclusion is evident, etc.
17. Again, every plurality is reducible to unity; but in God nothing is to be posited that is reducible to something else: therefore, etc.
18. Again, many in many express supreme distinction, therefore one in one expresses supreme unity, by the argument from opposites: therefore if in God there is supreme unity, it follows that there is no plurality there.
19. Again, God has nothing except from himself: therefore whatever person is God, whatever it has it has from itself; but only one person can be from itself: therefore with the unity of the divine being plurality on the part of person cannot stand.
20. Again, where there is plurality, there is diversity: and where there is diversity, there is a diminution of identity: and where there is a defect of identity, there is not supreme unity: therefore, etc.
But it is objected to the contrary by authority and by reason; by authority thus.
1. 1 John 5: Three are they who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one; I say one absolutely, which I say with no addition: therefore they are one absolutely: therefore the trinity does not take away unity.
2. Again, Bernard says to Eugene: "Among all unities, the unity of the Trinity holds the citadel"; but that which holds the summit among certain things has being in the highest degree: therefore the unity of the Trinity is the highest unity, therefore a true trinity and a highest unity stand together.