QUESTION II.
Whether a trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature.
Having supposed that God's being trine is a credible truth, it is consequently asked whether a trinity of persons can stand together with unity of nature. And concerning this, two things are asked.
The first is whether the divine being is supremely one.
Second, it is asked whether the supreme unity of nature can coexist with a trinity of persons.
ARTICLE I.
Whether the divine being is supremely one.
Concerning the first, we proceed as follows and it is shown that the divine being is supremely one. And that this is so, faith and divine Scripture sufficiently proclaim, Exodus twenty: Your God is one God; and Deuteronomy thirty-two: See therefore that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me; and David in the Psalm: There shall not be in you a new god, nor shall you adore a foreign god: and divine Scripture sufficiently preaches this.
And this very thing must be attempted to be demonstrated by reasons . For the mind of all who use reason supposes that God is that than which nothing greater or better can be thought, and therefore most excellent in nature and power, wisdom and goodness, influence and causality. For if He suffered defect in any of these, He would no longer be supreme, and therefore would not be God. Let these six things therefore be supposed as true and most certain.
1. From the side of the sublimity of nature , the argument proceeds thus. That which is borne above all things is more sublime than that which is not; therefore, if being borne above all things can belong to none but one, it is impossible that God be other than one, indeed it is impossible even to understand Him as such. For if several are understood, it is posited from this that one and the same is borne above another, and conversely: therefore if each is God, neither is God: therefore either God does not exist, or if He exists, He is one.
2. From the side of omnipotence , thus. Truly omnipotent is not only he who can do all things, but also he from whom is all power: but to be able to do all things and to cause all power can belong to one alone — for if it belonged to several, it would belong to neither — if therefore omnipotence belongs to God, it is impossible that God be other than one, indeed it is impossible even to understand Him as such: because if each is omnipotent, each can bring it about that every other power can do nothing: therefore if each is omnipotent, neither is omnipotent.
3. From the standpoint of supreme wisdom, the argument proceeds as follows. It belongs to the supremely wise to know all things: if therefore there were many gods, either each would be ignorant of the other, and so neither would be supremely wise, but rather truly foolish; or one would know the other, and this either through a likeness, or through essence, or through himself. But if through a likeness or through essence, he would receive something from the other and be informed by him; if through himself, he would be the principle of the other, and consequently either he or the other would not be God. Therefore supreme wisdom does not permit many gods to exist, and indeed does not even permit it to be supposed, because if many are thought of, they either have the same wisdom or diverse wisdoms. If diverse: then either one is superfluous, or each is imperfect. If the same: since each would be supreme wisdom, they would not then have a diverse nature; therefore they are not two.
4. From the standpoint of supreme goodness, the argument proceeds as follows. The supreme good is to be supremely loved and for its own sake: if therefore there are many supreme goods, then either one loves the other for its own sake, or not. If not: then neither is good. If so: then one beatifies the other; therefore neither is supreme. Therefore it is impossible that the supreme good be multiplied. Indeed this is even contrary to the understanding, because each is either a greater good or not. If not: then one is superfluous. If so: then neither is supreme. Therefore if many supreme goods are understood to exist, they are understood not to be supremely good.
5. From the standpoint of influence, the argument proceeds as follows. God influences all things most perfectly; therefore he gives the whole of being, not a part. But if there were many gods, either one would give nothing, and so would not be God; or each would give a part, or nothing, and so neither would be God; or each would give the same thing, and then each would simultaneously be in the same thing by essence, power, and presence. And because this follows upon supreme influence, either one would be in the other, or each would be circumscribed, and so neither would be God.
6. From the standpoint of supreme causality, the argument proceeds as follows. God is the first, ultimate, and most perfect cause, and consequently a cause in which there is a terminus in every mode, both according to the notion of effecting, exemplifying, and finalizing: therefore if there were many gods, each would be reduced to the other; therefore neither would be first, ultimate, and most perfect, and consequently neither would be God.
7. From the standpoint of all the foregoing, the argument proceeds as follows: because if there were many gods, they would either agree entirely in all the aforementioned conditions, or differ entirely, or partly agree and partly differ. If they agreed entirely: then there would not be many gods. If they differed entirely: then if one were God, the other would not be God. If however partly so and partly not: then in each there would be something and something else; therefore neither would be simple, and consequently neither would be God.
From these things it is argued that the divine being cannot be multiplied either in reality or in estimation.
To the contrary, it is argued first against the aforesaid arguments: 1. Because they do not seem to conclude what is true. For since that God is one is an article in which pagans, idolaters, infidels, and heretics have erred, all of whom have the use of reason: not only can it be thought, but it can also be estimated and believed that there are many gods; or if the contrary cannot be estimated, it is not an article of faith.
2. Likewise, they do not seem to conclude necessarily: because by the same arguments it can be proved that there are not in the divine being many persons, as is clear to one who examines the matter, whether from the standpoint of the sublimity of nature, or of power, or of wisdom, or of goodness, or of influence, or of causality. But if the arguments proceed from the same middle terms to conclude what is false, then they do not conclude necessarily.
3. Likewise, if from the aforesaid arguments it is necessarily demonstrated and proved that God is one: since "faith has no merit where human reason provides proof": therefore the merit of faith seems to be emptied: therefore they will be either fragile or useless.
From themselves objections are raised against them:
4. And first from sublimity. It is of greater sublimity to be exalted above things of a similar nature than of a dissimilar nature, and above great things than small things: if therefore the creature is not of a similar nature with God and in comparison to God is as nothing, God is not understood as supreme and most excellent if He is exalted only above created being. Therefore it seems to pertain to the divine excellence to posit many uncreated natures and again one above the rest.
5. From the standpoint of omnipotence, thus. "It belongs to perfect power, as Hilary says, that the nature of the maker can do what the word of the speaker can signify"; and again, reason dictates that so much power extends to so much, and greater power to the greater, and the greatest to the greatest: but God is most omnipotent: therefore since we can signify that there are many gods, God can make it so that they exist; and since He can make the lesser to exist, He can make the greater and the greatest: therefore He can make another besides Himself as great as He Himself is: therefore it accords with omnipotence that there be many gods.
6. From the standpoint of wisdom, thus: because it belongs to the highest wisdom to know something other than itself, and wisdom is so much more perfect as what is knowable is more perfect: if therefore nothing is altogether perfect except the being that is God, and the divine wisdom eternally knows something other than itself, and this with the most perfect knowledge: it seems that eternally there was something other than God which nevertheless was God: therefore the divine wisdom does not exclude but rather posits many divine essences.
7. From the standpoint of goodness, the argument proceeds as follows. "The good is maximally self-diffusive," and "more goods are to be preferred to fewer"; both of these are self-evidently true. But the supreme diffusion of the divine being cannot be in a creature; therefore it is in another uncreated nature, and once this is posited, the whole divine essence is better, because there will be more goods. Therefore, if everything better is to be attributed to God by reason of supreme goodness, it seems that supreme goodness does not exclude but rather requires multiple divine natures.