6. To that which is objected concerning Anselm's argument about the island, than which none better or greater can be thought: it must be said that the case is not similar, because when I say a being than which nothing greater can be thought, here there is no repugnance between the subject and the implication; and therefore it can reasonably be thought. But when I say an island than which none better can be thought, here there is repugnance between the subject and the implication. For "island" denotes a defective being, but the implication is of a most perfect being; and therefore, because there is an "opposition in the adjunct," it is irrationally thought, and the intellect contradicts itself in thinking it; and therefore it is not surprising if it cannot be inferred that what is so thought exists outside in reality. But it is otherwise with being or with God, to whom such an implication is not repugnant.
7. To that which is asked: in what sense is it said that God's existence cannot be thought not to be? The response is already clear: not because what "is said by the name" cannot be thought, that is, the signification of this statement "God does not exist"; but because it is so evident in itself and certain to the one who knows it, that if one wills to consider rightly, there is nothing by which one can be torn away from this truth. For it is a most evident and most present truth, which is absent from no place, no time, no thing, no thought; nor is this so of other created truths.
8. To that which is objected, that nothing do we hold more certainly than what we comprehend by faith: it must be said that this is true of the certitude of adherence, not of the certitude of understanding, as is apparent to one who considers it manifestly.
9. To that which is objected, that this is a hidden truth, and therefore maximally doubtable: it must be said that although God is simple and uniform in himself, nevertheless in a certain way he is hidden and in a certain way is manifest, as the Apostle intimates in Romans 1: What is known of God is manifest in them. For to some the trinity of appropriated attributes is manifest, to whom the trinity of persons is not manifest; and to someone the unity of essence is manifest, to whom the trinity of appropriated attributes is not manifest; and to someone the very trinity of God is manifest, to whom the very unity of essence is not manifest. But this is what is first manifest concerning God, namely his very entity, and in this respect it does not lie hidden but lies open; and therefore it is not doubtable but indubitable.
10. To that which is objected, that the soul doubting about things below it and beside it, etc.: it must be said that this does not hold, because although that God exists is above the soul according to nature, it is nevertheless within the soul according to knowledge and outside according to representation and persuasion, which every creature makes to it, because this truth is enclosed and understood in every truth.
11. To the objection that for God, to be and to be just are the same: it must be said that this does not follow, because, although it is the same in itself and according to itself, it is nevertheless not the same according to the apprehending reason and according to the representing effect: and therefore it is possible for one to be evident while the other is not evident.
12. To the objection that one strives in vain to prove that about which no one doubts: it must be said that, as is already clear, this truth does not need proof on account of a defect of evidence on its own part, but on account of a defect of consideration on our part. Hence reasonings of this kind are rather certain exercises of the intellect than arguments giving evidence and manifesting the very truth that is proved.
13. To the objection that no one knows principles unless he knows the terms: it must be said that this is true; but the knowledge of certain terms is hidden, while of others it is manifest. And again, concerning the signification of a term, knowledge can be had that is full, fuller, and fullest. According to this it must be understood that what God is can be known perfectly and fully and by way of comprehension, and thus He is known only by God alone; or clearly and perspicuously, and thus He is known by the Blessed; or in part and in an enigma, and thus it is known that God is the first and highest principle of all worldly things; and this, as far as it is in itself, can be manifest to all: because, since anyone knows that he has not always existed, he knows that he has had a principle, and by equal reasoning so also concerning other things; and because this knowledge offers itself to all, and once this is known, it is known that God exists: therefore it is indubitable to all, as far as it is in itself.
14. To the objection that to believe what is beyond doubt is not meritorious: it can be said that to believe that God exists, considered in itself, is not meritorious except insofar as it is subordinated to the belief that God is triune, or to other articles of faith, since these are founded upon it; and by reason of those articles it can become meritorious, because if it is believed nakedly by itself, it is not efficacious for meriting. The Apostle, moreover, speaks of the belief that God exists insofar as it is the foundation of other things to be believed; and this foundation is implanted in man by nature, lest, if the human intellect knew nothing of God from its own nature, it could excuse itself through ignorance. And this is what Master Hugh says: "Therefore God from the beginning of nature willed to be neither wholly manifest to human conscience nor wholly hidden, lest, if He were wholly manifest, faith would have no merit, nor would infidelity have any place: for infidelity would be convicted by what is manifest, and faith would not be exercised concerning what is hidden. But if He were wholly hidden, faith would not be aided by knowledge, and infidelity would be excused by ignorance. Wherefore it was necessary that God reveal Himself as hidden, lest, if He were wholly concealed, He would be utterly unknown, and again that He hide Himself though to some extent revealed and known, lest He be wholly manifest: so that there might be something known that would nourish the ingenuity of man, and again something hidden that would provoke it."
ARTICLE II. Whether that God is triune is a credible truth.
1. That truth without belief in which there can be no salvation is a truth most worthy of belief; but that God is triune is of this kind; therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Athanasius in the Creed: "Now the catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and the Trinity in unity"; and shortly before this is prefaced: "Which unless each one shall have kept whole and inviolate, he shall without doubt perish eternally": therefore, if without this faith there can be no salvation, the same conclusion as before follows.
3. Likewise, Augustine, in the first book On the Trinity, chapter three: "When the unity of the Trinity is sought—of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit—nowhere is error more dangerous, nor is anything sought with more labor, nor is anything found with more fruit"; but everything of this kind is most worthy of belief, in which there is danger in erring and salvation in rightly holding: since therefore that God is triune is a truth of this kind, the same conclusion as before follows.
4. Likewise, Augustine, in the first book of the Hypognosticon, chapter three, says that "no one can be saved without faith in the Mediator": therefore it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Mediator; but the Mediator cannot be known unless the distinction of persons is known: therefore to believe the distinction of persons is necessary for salvation. But this distinction of persons is in the Trinity: therefore that God is triune is a truth which it is necessary to believe for salvation.
5. Likewise, no one can be saved in whom the Trinity does not dwell: for the entire Trinity dwells simultaneously in a person through grace: but the Trinity does not dwell except in one who believes: therefore no one can be saved unless he believes the most blessed Trinity. The major is manifest: the minor is proved thus through that which is said in John fourteen, that the Spirit of truth the world cannot receive, because it does not see him nor know him: but you shall know him, because he shall abide with you and shall be in you.
6. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who is not a member of Christ: but one cannot be a member unless one is connected: and one cannot be connected except through faith, hope, and charity: therefore no one can be saved without faith in Christ. But faith in Christ includes faith in the eternal generation, and according to that the distinction of the Trinity is discerned: therefore without faith in the Trinity it is impossible for anyone to be saved.
7. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who does not believe that God is a creative principle; for unless this is believed about God, God is in no way rightly worshipped and venerated by man: but it is nobler to be a generative principle than a creative principle, because the begotten offspring is nobler than the made creature: therefore no one can be saved who does not believe that God is a generative principle, and by equal reasoning also a spirative principle, and through this, unless he believes that God is triune.
8. Likewise, it is impossible for anyone to be saved who does not love and honor him who is to be supremely loved and honored: but the Son and the Holy Spirit are to be supremely loved and honored, just as the Father, according to that which is said in John five: He who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father, who sent him: therefore no one can be saved who does not love and honor the Son and the Holy Spirit, just as the Father. But no one loves and honors unless he in some way knows and believes: therefore etc.
From these things it is manifestly shown that to believe that God is triune is necessary and due for salvation.
Likewise, that it is fitting is shown.
9. A right affection adheres more to the supreme goodness than to itself: therefore also a right intellect assents more to the supreme truth than to itself. If therefore our intellect is rectified by believing, it is necessary that some truth be proposed to it which exceeds its judgment: but the first among true and credible things proposed is that God is triune and one: therefore although it lies hidden from the human intellect, it is rightly and fittingly proposed for belief.
10. Likewise, just as charity captivates the affection into the service of Christ, so faith captivates the intellect; but it would not captivate unless it made one assent to some truth that exceeds its judgment: therefore it is fitting that the first among credible things proposed exceed the human intellect.
11. Furthermore, "that which seems so to all, or to most, or to the wise, by that very fact that it seems so, is rendered probable": therefore that which is believed by most, or by the wise, by that very fact that it is believed, is rendered credible: but that God is triune is believed by most and by the wise: therefore it is fitting to believe that He is triune.
12. Furthermore, it is more unreasonable to hold that an innumerable multitude believes something incredible than to hold that what is believed by a multitude is credible: but it is most certain that God being triune is believed by a multitude: therefore it is reasonable to believe thus.
13. Furthermore, just as understanding is owed to reason, so believing is owed to authority; but nothing is more authoritative than sacred Scripture, which has its stability not only from its assertion of truth and its antiquity, but also from miracles and prophecies: if therefore the divine Scriptures commonly attest this truth, it is fitting and reasonable to believe that truth, namely that God is one in Trinity.