Second, carelessness arises from the appearance of a defect in the governance of providence; which appearance is shown in two ways.
I turned to another thing etc. As was said above, carelessness is found among the wicked: first, because the retribution of justice seems to be lacking; second, because the governance of providence seems to be lacking. The defect that appears to exist in the retribution of justice has been treated; here secondly is treated the defect that appears to exist concerning the governance
of providence, for these things do not seem to be governed in an orderly fashion, but by chance. And this part has two sections, because first the defect of order is shown generally, and second specifically, at: This wisdom also I have seen etc., concerning the disorder of authority.
First the defect of order is shown in general.
Concerning the first he proceeds thus. First he shows the disorder and chance that seems to exist with respect to the conduct of life; second, that which seems to exist with respect to the termination of death, at: Man does not know his own end.
(Verse 11) Therefore, with respect to the conduct of life he shows the disorder, because things are not suited to those ends for which they have fitness. For which reason he says: I turned to another thing, because above he considered retribution, here he turns to considering order. And I saw under the sun, and he enumerates five gratuitously given gifts that are defrauded of their proper acts: the race is not to the swift, though they are fitted for running: Amos 2: "Flight shall perish from the swift." Nor the battle to the strong, though they are fitted for fighting: 2 Kings 1: "The mighty have fallen, and the weapons of war have perished." Nor bread to the wise, though they are fitted for distributing provisions; Isaiah 3: "I am not a physician, and in my house there is no bread." Nor riches to the learned, though they are fitted for possessing all gifts; below in the same chapter: "There was found in it a poor man." Nor favor to the skilled, though they are fitted for doing pleasing works: Isaiah 20: "All who worked well were confounded." But time and chance in all things, as though all things come by chance and temporal things are subject to change: above in chapter 3: "All things have their season and pass away in their appointed times." And the aforementioned gifts are distinguished, because the first two regard the body: agility, for attaining what is desired, and strength for resisting evil inflicted; the three following regard the soul, namely wisdom in the heart, learning in speech, and skill in work.
(Verse 12). Man does not know his end, etc. Here the second is touched upon, namely the deficiency of governance with respect to the termination of death, because it is determined for no one, neither when nor how he must die. And it seems that such or such a death happens by chance. And therefore he says: Man does not know his end, that is, the day of death: Matthew twenty-four: "Watch therefore, for you do not know at what hour your Lord will come." And he gives an example of how there is disorder and a game of uncertainty, saying: But as fish are caught by the hook, namely unknowingly, and as birds are caught in the snare, namely by deceit; Ecclesiasticus eleven: "As a partridge is lured into a cage, and as a roe deer into a snare, so also is the heart of the proud." So are men caught in an evil time: First Thessalonians five: "When they shall say: Peace and security, sudden destruction shall come upon them." When it shall come upon them suddenly, that is, unexpectedly: Isaiah thirty: "Suddenly, when it is not expected, its destruction shall come, and it shall be shattered like a potter's vessel."
Spiritually, here is intimated the heavenly election of the good, and afterwards the hidden damnation of the wicked. Therefore, in order to attribute the entire operation of the good to God, he says first: The race is not to the swift, because it is not from themselves that they run, but from God: Romans nine: "It is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy." Nor the battle to the strong, because in the Psalm: "The king is not saved by great strength." Nor bread to the wise, from themselves, but from God: John six: "My Father gives you the true bread from heaven." Nor riches to the learned, namely of wisdom and knowledge, from themselves, but from God: First Corinthians one: "In all things you have been made rich in him," namely in Christ. Nor favor to the skillful, from themselves, but from God: Psalm: "God loves mercy and truth; the Lord will give grace and glory."
But as to the hidden damnation of the wicked, he says: Man does not know his end, because "the way of the wicked is dark," etc. As fish by the hook, that is, the pleasure-seekers, who are caught by the hook of pleasure: Habakkuk one: "They lift up everything with the hook." And as birds by the snare, that is, the ambitious by the snare of honor: First Timothy three: "Not a neophyte, lest, puffed up with pride, he fall into the judgment of the devil." So are men caught, that is, the avaricious, in an evil time: Job twenty-seven: "The rich man, when he shall sleep, shall take nothing with him."
QUESTIONS.
I. A doubt can be raised about what he says, that he saw time and chance in all things.
Therefore according to this it seems that all things happen by chance.
But to the contrary. It seems that not all things happen by chance:
Because those things which happen according to purpose do not happen by chance; but many things are done from purpose; therefore not all things happen by chance.
2. Furthermore, it seems that in nothing is there chance, because as Plato says, "there is nothing apart from the first cause whose origin a legitimate cause has not preceded": therefore according to this nothing happens by chance, but all things proceed from a determinate cause.
3. Likewise, in every operation God is the principal agent; but whatever God does principally, He does both knowingly and by design, and nothing of such a kind happens by chance: therefore nothing at all happens by chance.
I respond: it must be said that chance and fortune are causes per accidens, not because they are other causes than causes per se, but because when nature and intellect do something to which they are directly ordered, they do this per se, and there is no chance there; but when from their operation something occurs to which they are not directly ordered, on account of the concurrence of another cause, there is chance: as is clear in the case of the creditor found in the marketplace and the stone falling upon one's head. I say therefore that if the outcomes of things are compared to the first cause, which is God: since God foresees all things, nothing is by chance according to the ordering of divine foreknowledge. But if we speak by comparison to created causes, either concerning immutable ones, as is the case with the motion of the higher bodies, or concerning mutable ones, as are the lower causes which are under the sun: in the disposition of these mutable causes, it is hardly possible that some unintended effect does not concur, indeed beyond intention: and therefore chance is found in all things, not because all things happen by chance, but because concerning every mutable creature something happens by chance.
3. As for what is objected concerning divine foreknowledge, the answer is already clear. For chance is not spoken of in comparison to divine foreknowledge.
2. As for what is objected secondly, that all things have a cause: it must be said that it is true that all things have a legitimate cause, namely nature or intellect, but nevertheless by this it is not excluded that they can do or do something beyond the intended order, God excepted.
II. It is asked concerning what he says: As fishes are caught with a hook: whether the catching of fish is by chance or not. That it is, seems as follows:
1. Because that this fish comes rather than another, this is not by nature nor by reason: therefore it is by chance.
2. Likewise, that one man catches and another does not: this is not by reason of nature or of art: therefore it is by chance.
But to the contrary: If someone intending to find gold were digging, it would not be chance: therefore since one who fishes intends to catch, there is no chance there.
I respond: it must be said that one can speak of the catching by comparison to those who catch, and thus it is not by chance: one can also speak by comparison to the fish, which go to the hook: and because they go on account of food, and something else occurs, with respect to them there is chance.
Second, the defect of order in the governance of providence is shown in particular, and this in three ways.