Chapter IX.
(Verse 1). There are just and wise ones etc. Here the second point is touched upon, namely the uncertainty of discernment. For a man does not know of himself whether he is a good man or an evil one, even the good man himself. Therefore he says: There are just and wise ones, and thus good; and their works are in the hand of God, that is, in the power of knowing, accepting, and rewarding. In his hand are merits and rewards. There are merits of good thoughts: Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord." There are merits of good affections: Psalm: "In his hand are all the ends of the earth." There are also merits of good speeches: Wisdom 7: "In his hand are both we and our words." There are also merits of good works, as in the passage at hand. There are also rewards in his hand: Wisdom 3: "The souls of the just are in the hand of God"; and since they are in the hand of God, they ought to be known. And yet man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred, and thus he does not know how to discern; 1 Corinthians 4: "I am conscious of nothing against myself, but I am not justified in this" etc.
(Verse 2). But all things are reserved for the future. Here the third point is noted, namely the reason for uncertainty,
which arises from this, that in the present, recompense is not made according to merits, but is reserved for the future. And therefore he says thus: Man does not know... But all things are reserved uncertain for the future, so that they may be made certain; 1 Corinthians 4: "Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will both illuminate the hidden things of darkness and make manifest the counsels of hearts"; which indeed he does not do now, but reserves, according to that passage in Job 14: "You have sealed up my transgressions as in a bag"; and thus in the present all things are in hiddenness. And it is added: Because all things equally befall the just and the impious etc.: all things, good and evil, equally befall the just and the sinner, whom he describes under six differences. The just and the impious, with regard to the belief of faith, which justifies the impious: Habakkuk 2: "The just man lives by his faith." The good and the evil, with regard to the purity of love, because holy love makes one good: Matthew 7: "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." The clean and the unclean, with regard to the uprightness of conduct: for that is observed in outward things, Tobit 4. The one offering sacrifices and victims, and the one despising sacrifices, with regard to
COMMENT. IN ECCLESIASTEN C. LX.
the devotion of religion ,— Exodus twelve: "This is the religion of the Passover; no foreigner shall eat of it." As the good, so also the sinner, with respect to the observance of the commandments, the observance of which makes the good, and the transgression makes sinners; Daniel nine: "We have sinned, we have committed iniquity, and we have departed and turned aside from your commandments and judgments." As the perjurer, so also he who truly swears, with respect to the speaking of truth: deterat, where de- intensifies, not diminishes; deterat, that is, he truly swears, according to which signification it is taken in First Kings twenty: "And Jonathan continued to swear to David, because he loved him." Equal things befall all these both with respect to the condition of nature, according to Wisdom seven: "Therefore there is one entrance for all into life, and a like departure"; and with respect to the condition of fault: Romans three: "All have sinned and lack the glory of God"; and with respect to the condition of punishment: Ecclesiasticus eight: "Remember that we are all in corruption."
(Verse 3.). This is the worst etc. Here the fourth is touched upon, namely the origin of vain security, because great security arises from this lack of distinction, which is the occasion of many sins. Therefore he says: And this is the worst among all things that are done under the sun, because the same things befall all. Therefore the worst, because the occasion of many sins; for God does not seem to care about us. Whence arises that saying of Job twenty-two: "The clouds are his hiding place, and he does not consider our affairs." And he shows that evils arise from this, because security arises, through which man falls into malice and contempt. Therefore he says: Whence also the hearts of the children of men, that is, of the wicked and the carnal, are filled with malice and contempt. In the filling, a multitude of vices is designated, so that malice is in the concupiscible, and contempt in the irascible, which are the two roots of sins; Genesis six: "The earth was corrupted before God and filled with iniquity"; and this in their life, that is, as long as they have a place for meriting: First Thessalonians two: "That they may fill up their sins always." And because such are cast headlong into punishment, therefore he adds: And after these things they shall be led down to hell: the Psalm: "But you, O God, shall lead them down into the pit of destruction"; and Job twenty-one: "They spend their days in prosperity, and in a moment they descend to hell."
Questions.
I. Here arises a question concerning what he said : I understood that man can find no reason for the works of God.
Therefore, if we ought to know the reason of what we understand, and we can find the reason of nothing, then we understand nothing.
2. Likewise, rational nature exists for understanding and seeing the reason of things: therefore, if we cannot find the reason, we possess rational power in vain.
I respond: it must be said that "words are to be understood according to the subject matter"; he however does not speak of the works of God generally, but of the divine judgments, which are works of God, according to that verse of the Psalm: Great are the works of the Lord, etc. "These judgments, as Gregory says, are not to be scrutinized, but to be venerated with fearful silence"; because, even if they have a reason, they nevertheless have a hidden reason, and one which we cannot investigate by ourselves, because it is above us; and if we do understand, this is through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who searches the deep things of God, not through human discovery. Of other works, such as creatures, many reasons are found, and many sciences are possessed; but he does not speak of those works here.
II. Likewise, there is a doubt about what he says: Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred.
This seems false: 1. Because Romans 8: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? I am certain, etc.: therefore there is an objection against it there.
You will say that he knew by revelation; it is objected that man can know by himself, because the worthiness of divine love places in us sanctifying grace; but Augustine says that those things which are essentially in the soul are better known than those which are known according to species: therefore if we are certain of those things which we know according to species, as when something sweet is placed upon the tongue, much more so of grace.
2. Likewise, Augustine says that he who has faith is certain that he has faith. Therefore he who has love or charity is certain that he has it: therefore he who has grace is certain: therefore he is certain whether he is pleasing to God.
3. Likewise, concerning hatred one can be certain: indeed, he who has sinned and wills to sin is certain that he is worthy of hatred.
On the contrary: I. First Corinthians 4: I am conscious of nothing against myself, yet I am not justified in this, etc.
2. Likewise, Job 9: If he comes to me, I shall not see him; and if he departs, I shall not perceive it; and in the same place: If I am simple, my very soul shall be ignorant of this.
3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 5: Concerning the forgiven sin, do not be without fear: therefore no one is certain.
To this some respond that the passage is understood concerning the hatred of predestination and reprobation, of which no one is certain; and thus there is no objection, because predestination does not place in us any effect through which it could be known. It must be answered otherwise, because this response does not satisfy the text: for the text says: He does not know whether he is worthy of love; but no one is worthy of or merits being predestined: therefore it is understood according to present justice.
On account of this, others respond that knowledge is twofold, namely necessary and infallible: and this we cannot have, because no one can know with certitude whether he has grace, except through revelation, as the Apostle did. There is another kind that is probable and through signs: and this indeed can be had and is had, because many know through probable signs that they are in grace.
i. 2. To the objection, then, that [the soul] sees essentially : I say that habits in the soul are not known except through the fact that the soul sees itself disposed toward some act; and because the acts of unformed and formed faith and of gratuitous and natural love are so similar that a man can scarcely or never discern between them: therefore, even if he knows the habit, he nevertheless does not know whether it is gratuitous.
3. To the objection concerning hatred, I say that he speaks of the just, because they do not know whether they are worthy of love or hatred; not of the openly wicked.
Yet whatever the case may be concerning charity and faith—whether a man knows that he has them or not—he nevertheless does not know whether he is worthy of the love or hatred of God: for we can believe, but how do we know that the Lord hates the wicked and loves the good, when He bestows so many and such great goods upon the wicked as upon the good? Hence Ecclesiastes did not say that they do not know themselves to be just, but that they do not know themselves to be beloved by God.