Chapter VII.
(Verse 1.). What need is there? Here he calls back a third time from scrutinizing lofty things and inquiring into them, and this, since he has enough to do in knowing his own evils, or common ones. Therefore he says: What need is there for a man to seek things greater than himself? as if to say, there is no need: Sirach 3: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy strength"; and Romans 11: "Be not high-minded, but fear." And he adds the reason why he ought not to seek greater things: Since he does not know what is profitable for him in his life, that is, what is useful for him: Wisdom 9: "We can hardly guess at the things that are upon earth, and with labor do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven, who shall search out?" He is indeed ignorant of what is useful in this momentary life; whence he adds: In the number of the days of his pilgrimage; Genesis 47: "The days of the pilgrimage of my life are few and evil"; 2 Corinthians 5: "While we are in this body, we are pilgrims from the Lord." And in the time which passes like a shadow;
1 Chronicles, last chapter: "We are pilgrims before thee and strangers, as were all our fathers. Our days upon earth are as a shadow, and there is no delay." And so he cannot inquire by himself, nor even learn from another; therefore he adds: Or who can tell him what shall come after him under the sun? For man does not know future things, unless the Lord reveals them through grace. Therefore man ought not to extend his thought to this: Isaiah 48: "Before the day thou heardest them not, lest perhaps thou shouldst say: Behold, I knew them. Thou hast neither heard nor known, neither was thine ear opened from that time"; below in chapter 8: "Man is ignorant of things past, and things to come he can know by no messenger." Whence God alone knows and reveals future things.
Questions.
I. But it is asked concerning what he says: It is better to see what you desire than to desire what you do not know. Therefore it does not involve a contradiction that someone can desire what he does not know.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine says that "we can love things unseen, but things unknown in no way"; thus therefore, in order for something to be loved and desired, it is necessary that it be known.
2. Furthermore, the affection follows the intellect; therefore where the intellect does not precede, the affection does not extend itself; but the intellect does not extend itself to those things which it does not know; therefore neither does the affection desire those things.
I respond: it must be said that there is a twofold knowledge, namely of certitude and of estimation ; and so correspondingly there is a twofold ignorance: one through the privation of any certitude, and another through the privation of any estimation. I say therefore that in order for something to be desired, it is not necessary that knowledge of certitude precede: for desire follows estimation alone; but it is necessary that some knowledge of estimation precede. Here, however, he speaks of ignorance through the privation of certitude.
II. The question is raised concerning what he says: What need is there for a man to seek things greater than himself? From this it seems that man ought not to investigate anything nor come to know by labor what is above him.
This same point is proved by Ecclesiasticus 3: Seek not things that are higher than yourself. Likewise, Romans 11: Be not high-minded, but fear.
But to the contrary: 1. Man stands in the middle between visible creatures and God; but Augustine says that the soul of man is darkened when it fixes its eye on these earthly and lowest things, but is illuminated when it turns to eternal goods: therefore it ought always to seek those things. But those things are higher: therefore, etc.
2. Furthermore, the soul is never perfected with complete perfection except in those things which are higher than itself; but everything perfectible ought to tend toward and seek that in which it is perfected: therefore it ought to seek higher things.
If you say that he does not mean that one ought not to seek or consider things higher according to substance, but that one ought not to consider those things which exceed the possibility of one's consideration, it is objected then: because all things that belong to faith are above our intellect: therefore according to this our intellect ought not to raise itself to believing those things which belong to faith.
3. Likewise, then those who wish to examine the articles of faith would be most blameworthy: therefore all who dispute about faith would be blameworthy.
I respond: it must be said that emphasis should be placed on what he says, greater than himself, and on what he says, to seek. Greater than himself he calls those things which exceed our consideration, insofar as they exceed it. To seek he calls to inquire into and examine, as if to say that it is foolish to wish to investigate those things which our inquiry cannot reach, with respect to those things for which our consideration does not suffice. For there are some things which are manifest to us concerning God, and those are not greater than us: hence he does not discourage the consideration of God. 2. 3. As to the objection concerning faith, it must be said that he does not dissuade from believing, but from seeking. — Furthermore, even though the things of faith are above our intellect by itself when bare, they are nevertheless not above the intellect illuminated by the grace of faith: hence to seek those things and to believe and to investigate up to that point to which the light of faith extends is not to extend oneself to greater things; and such is every sober disputation concerning the articles themselves. But if one exceeds this, unless it be from God, then such excess is blameworthy.
III. The question is also raised concerning what he says: Who can show him what shall come after him under the sun?
To the contrary: In our soul there is a power which is to become all things and to make all things; but the possible intellect can receive in itself all present things, all past things, and all future things: therefore if the agent intellect can reduce it to act, then man can of himself know future things.
I respond: it must be said that even if the agent can form or abstract cognition in the possible intellect, nevertheless its operation depends both on the certitude of the thing outside and internally on sense; because "when the thing is lacking, knowledge perishes"; and "when a sense is lacking, it is necessary that one science be lacking according to that sense." Because therefore future contingents do not generate a likeness of themselves in sense, neither through themselves nor through a determinate antecedent cause: and they do not have in themselves the stability that is required for cognition: therefore our intellect, which receives from things, cannot of itself come to the cognition of them, except through him whose cognition does not depend on things.
Second, the teachings of wisdom are set forth, through which a remedy is applied against the vanity of foolishness.
A good name is better. Above he set forth the manner of learning; here second he adds the teachings of wisdom, through which a remedy is applied against the vanity of foolishness. And since, as is said in Wisdom 8, "wisdom teaches sobriety, prudence, justice, and virtue" or fortitude: therefore this part has four parts. In the first he sets forth teachings for having modesty: in the second, for having constancy, there: Oppression etc.: in the third, for having prudence, there: Do not say, what is the cause that etc.; in the fourth, for having justice, there: Be not exceedingly wicked etc.
First, five teachings are set forth for having modesty.
For having modesty he provides five teachings. In the first he teaches to prefer the honorable to the pleasant: in the second, future life to the present: in the third, affliction to pleasure: in the fourth, sorrow to merriment: in the fifth, severity to softness or flattery.
(Verse 2). He therefore sets forth the teaching in which he teaches to prefer the honorable, such as a good name, to the pleasant, such as ointment: therefore he says: A good name is better, that is, a good reputation displayed by good men, concerning which Sirach 41: "Have care for a good name, for this shall remain with you more than a thousand precious and great treasures." Than precious ointments, which indeed are very fragrant, according to what is said in John 12: "Mary took a pound of ointment of precious spikenard and anointed the feet of Jesus: and the house was filled with the odor of the ointment"; and although ointments are fragrant, nevertheless a good name is more so, therefore it is better: 2 Corinthians 2: "We are the good odor of Christ unto God in every place," namely as regards good reputation.
And the day of death. Here the second teaching is noted, in which he prefers future life to the present, and thus entrance into another life to entrance into this one. And therefore he says: And the day of death, supply: is better than the day of birth, because one dies to rest; Revelation 14: "Blessed are the dead who in
die in the Lord: henceforth, says the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors." But here one is born to labor: Job five: "Man is born to labor, and a bird to flight"; and therefore [death is] better: whence Sirach thirty: "Death is better than a bitter life, and eternal rest than persevering illness."