I respond: it must be said that one is not bound: indeed, if he does it, he adds sin upon sin: whence Jephthah too, by fulfilling his vow, sinned more than if he had not fulfilled it; because in vowing he was foolish and in fulfilling he was impious, as Augustine says.
3. To the objection that he is commended: it must be said that he is commended neither for his vow nor for the fulfillment of his vow, because the Apostle commends there faith, and commends the faith of Jephthah, namely that he believed he would triumph over his enemies by the Lord's help.
1. To the objection that it brings advantage: I say that this is false; because immediately in the vow itself he sins and is worthy of punishment.
2. To the objection concerning truth, it must be said that truth lays judgment beneath itself: because therefore he vowed without judgment, he cannot fulfill it with truth: and for this reason there cannot be truth in such a vow, and therefore there is no obligation.
II. It is asked whether one can commute a vow.
That one cannot seems to be shown by that passage in the last chapter of Leviticus: It cannot be changed, neither for worse nor for better.
But that one can seems to be shown: because it is permitted to make the Lord's portion better: therefore, even if it is not permitted to change for the worse, it is nevertheless permitted to change for the better.
I respond: it must be said that there is changing a vow entirely for the worse, and there is changing it for the better in a way that includes the original, as when one who vowed to enter a less perfect religious order enters a more perfect one that encloses the former within it. There is also changing it for the better in a way that does not include the original, as changing a pilgrimage to Rome into a journey overseas.
The first is in no way permitted, but is prohibited: the second is permitted of itself: the third is permitted, but not without the authority of a superior. For because I am obligated to the Lord, I cannot change it except at his discretion: and because he does not speak to me except through his minister, who holds his place, I cannot change it without the authority of a superior, unless the Lord himself most certainly inspires it interiorly. And thus that passage is clear.
III. It is also asked concerning what he says: Do not say before the Angel: There is no providence.
On the contrary: it seems that there is no providence:
I. First, because providence gives due order to things; but this order does not exist in the world, below in the tenth chapter: I saw servants on horses and princes walking upon the earth like servants.
2. Likewise second: because providence gives due recompense, but this does not exist in the world, below in the ninth chapter: The same things happen to all.
3. Likewise third: because it gives due duration; but this simply does not exist in the world, below in the seventh chapter: The impious man lives a long time in his impiety.
But that it is necessary to posit providence is shown:
I. Because it belongs to the wise man to provide for his household; therefore much more so to the supremely wise.
2. Likewise, it belongs to the wise artisan not only to make but also to preserve; thus God preserves and governs; but he is wise, and the wise man governs everything that he governs through providence; therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, because God is supremely wise, he cannot fail to see our evils; therefore, since he is supremely just, he cannot fail to punish evils and reward good things; therefore there is recompense for all things, and therefore also providence.
IV. Likewise it is asked who sins more: whether he who denies providence, or he who criticizes divine providence.
It seems that he who denies sins more, because he who believes that providence exists, by the very fact that he believes, does well; therefore he has something of good; but he who simply denies has nothing; therefore he is more blameworthy.
On the contrary: Jerome says that he who posits providence and accuses God sins more than he who simply denies providence.
I respond to the first point that providence exists.
1. To what is objected concerning due order, the response is that order is twofold, namely particular and universal: something can be deprived of particular order, but not of universal order, as Boethius says. Universal order embraces all things; whence he who falls from the order of nature falls into the order of punishment; just as Augustine's example is of the cloud, in which there is a whirlwind and a turning that is disordered in itself, but ordered toward the breaking of the earth; so the wicked rule over the good for the exercise of the good and the punishment of the wicked.
2. Similarly concerning recompense it must be said that in the present life good things come to the wicked in a just manner, so that they may be rewarded here and eternally tormented in the future; and evil things come to the good, so that they may be purified here and eternally rewarded.
3. To what is objected concerning life, it must be said that the wicked live long for the aforesaid reason, but the good die; because it is said of Enoch that he was taken away, lest wickedness should change his understanding. Since therefore the divine judgments are hidden in the present life for the testing of men, and since the simple and unlearned do not perceive hidden things, it seems that all things are disordered; and therefore Ecclesiastes teaches us to look to him under whom all things are ordered.