As to the objection, then, that one of two contraries does not have its origin from the other: it must be said that water is not contrary to water; and if it has a contrary disposition, it has this not by nature but by accident, as is evident in hot and cold water. Nor is the origin of rivers from the sea by reason of property, because sweetness is prior by nature in water, but with respect to outflow, as the drawing of wine from a cask: because that place contains an abundance of waters, from which emanation ceaselessly occurs.
Second, the vanity of the mutability of things is considered according to the being which they have in the human intellect, and this is proven by a threefold argument.
All things are difficult etc. Above, the vanity in things was determined according to the being, which they have in the universe: here vanity is determined according to the being, which they have in the human intellect: and vanity is shown in them in three ways: first, because they are not evident: second, because they do not satisfy, at: The eye is not satisfied with seeing: third, because they do not endure, at: There is no remembrance of former things. They are not evident for interpreting or teaching; they do not satisfy so as to refresh and quiet the learner; they do not endure for remembering. And these three correspond to a threefold power in us: the interpretive, the cognitive, and the memorative.
(Vers. 8.). First, therefore, it is noted that they are not evident for explaining; thus he says: All things are difficult, namely for discovering their reason; whence Wisdom 9: "With difficulty we estimate the things that are on earth, and we find with labor the things that are before us"; below in chapter 8: "I understood that man can find no reason for the works of God" etc.; and therefore, because they are difficult, man cannot explain them in speech: Job 38: "Who shall declare the reason of the heavens"? Sirach 43: (We shall say much and shall fall short in words: the consummation of words is he himself".
(Vers. 8. 9.10.). Is not satisfied etc. Here in the second place it is touched upon that they do not fill so as to refresh the learner; and because we learn most by two senses, namely sight and hearing, he shows that in neither is there satiety; and therefore he says: The eye is not satisfied with seeing: Proverbs twenty-seven: "For the eyes of men are insatiable." Nor is the ear filled with hearing, since there is an itching to hear new and curious things: Second Timothy four: "They will heap up to themselves teachers according to their own desires, having itching ears." And the reason for this is that that in which there is true satiety, neither has the eye seen nor has the ear perceived: First Corinthians two: "Neither has the eye seen, nor has the ear heard" etc.
And that one cannot be refreshed in these earthly things, he shows, because the eye and ear wish to perceive new things; but nothing remains in newness; therefore the ear and eye are filled by nothing. He supposes the major premise, and it is made manifest in Acts seventeen: "The Athenians spent their time in nothing else but either saying or hearing something new"; but here he proposes the minor, because nothing has newness, neither with respect to being nor with respect to becoming. Therefore he says: What is it that has been? He asks and he himself responds: The same that shall be; therefore by simple conversion: what shall be has been. Similarly it follows: What is it that has been done? He responds: The same that is to be done; therefore by simple conversion: what is to be done has been done. — And from this he concludes: Nothing is new under the sun, nor can anyone say: Behold this is recent; therefore neither to say nor to hear anything new. And he repeats the proof: For they have already gone before in the ages that were before us: Second Peter three: "Since our fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they are."
(Vers. 11.). There is no remembrance of former things. In the third place it is touched upon here that things do not endure so as to be remembered, because all things are delivered to oblivion; whence he says: There is no remembrance of former things, namely among us who come after: Wisdom two: "Our name shall receive oblivion through time, and no one shall have remembrance of our works." And so it is in things past and in things future; whence he adds: But neither indeed shall there be remembrance of those things that are to come hereafter among those who shall be in the last time, that is: later generations shall not be mindful of former things, and this on account of time, which brings on oblivion; below in chapter two: "Future times shall cover all things with oblivion."
Questions.
I. It is asked concerning what he says: All things are difficult.
On the contrary: 1. There are many things whose knowledge is common to us and to brutes; therefore it is not difficult for man to know what a beast knows.
2. Likewise, there are certain things in which it does not happen to err, as in the knowledge of sensible things
because the sense is not deceived regarding its proper object
and of intelligible principles, such as axioms, and such things are easy to know.
3. Likewise, what does he mean when he says: Man cannot explain them in speech? It is easier for man to speak than for any creature to operate easily; therefore if it is easy for any creature to operate, then it is easy for man to explain its operation.
I respond: it must be said that there is knowing incompletely, as when something is known according to its accidents, or according to some operation. There is again knowing perfectly, and he knows perfectly who fully knows the substance, power, and operation, and the causes and reasons of these. And because power is hidden, and substance is remote from the senses, therefore all things are difficult for us.
1. As to the objection that we know some things in common with brute animals, this is true in a certain way, as that this is bitter; but a brute animal knows nothing fully.
2. Similarly the second is clear: because insofar as something is sensible, it is manifest.
3. Through this the following is also clear: because to say something and to explain it differ: for to explain is to draw out hidden reasons that are inwardly wrapped up; and no one can do this unless he understands; and this is arduous and belongs to few.
II. Likewise, there is a question about what he says: The eye is not satisfied with seeing, etc.
1. It is asked why he does not adduce the other senses, since it is similarly possible to know through them?
2. Likewise, what does he mean when he says: Is not satisfied? For one is said to be satisfied when he no longer desires more of what he was desiring; but it sometimes happens that a man does not want to see or hear more, but rather to rest: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, if it is not satisfied, then their desire never rests; therefore since a desire that has no rest is frustrated of its end, and every such thing is vain, therefore the desire of sight is vain.
I respond: it must be said that he mentions only these two senses because he speaks of the senses insofar as they are a way into knowledge and are referred to sensual delight. And the word by which we recognize all things is twofold: namely the divine word and the human word. The divine word is every creature, because it speaks God: this word the eye perceives. The human word is the uttered voice, and this the ear perceives.
Or because knowledge is twofold: through discovery and teaching; for the first regards sight, while the second regards hearing.
1. 2. As to the objection about satisfaction: I say that he speaks of the satisfaction of these insofar as they are organs of the heart and of the will or appetite; and because the heart is not satisfied, neither are these two senses. Hence Hugh: "All beauty, all delight, all sweetness of created things can affect the human heart, but cannot satisfy it—only that sweetness alone, for which it was made, can satisfy it."