Collation 6 - Collations on the Hexaemeron — Bonaventure
English Latin
600 SIXTH COLLATION 601 Third Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the First Exemplary Cause of the Virtues, and the Exemplary and Cardinal Virtues Flowing from It COLLATIO VI DE PRIMA VISIONE TRACTATIO TERTIA, QUAE EST DE PRIMA VIRTUTUM CAUSA EXEMPLARI, DE VIRTUTIBUS EXEMPLARIBUS ET DE CARDINALIBUS INDE FLUENTIBUS
A. Third Treatise on the First Vision, Concerning the First Exemplary Cause of the Virtues, and the Exemplary and Cardinal Virtues Flowing from It
1. GOD saw the light that it was good; and He divided the light from the darkness, etc. The passage, God saw the light, is quoted on account of the first vision of the intelligence, which is infused by nature. It means that God made it possible to see. This has been covered in the two preceding collations by considering the sciences, in that the light shines as the truth of things, the truth of words, and the truth of moral acts. And nine parts were distinguished in the doctrine, of which the three principal are radiations proceeding, according to Augustine, from the decree of the eternal light. It was also established that God saw, that is, made it possible to see, through wisdom-procuring contemplation, through the enlightenment of the soul seen in itself as in a mirror, seen in the intelligence (s) and in a conveying medium, and in the uncreated light as in its fountainhead, in accordance with the six conditions which this light impresses upon the mind. And in accordance with these, the soul rises up in the said light by means of reasoning, testing, and understanding, as it has been said. And the philosophers—at least the most worthy among them—and the ancients have come to this point: that there exists a beginning and an end and an exemplary reason. 1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris etc. Propter primam visionem intelligentiae per naturam inditae sumptum est verbum illud: Vidit Deus lucem , id est videre fecit. De hoc supra in duabus collationibus dictum est, et per considerationem scientialem, pro eo quod radiat lux ut veritas rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum. Et fuerunt distinctae novem partes doctrinae, quarum tres principales sunt radii, et sunt ex dictamine lucis aeternae, secundum Augustinum. -- Item, quod vidit, id est, videre fecit per contemplationem sapientialem, illuminando animam in se tanquam in speculo, in Intelligentia tanquam in medio delativo, in luce increata tanquam in obiecto fontano, secundum illas sex conditiones, quas imprimit menti; et secundum has consurgit anima in illam lucem ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo, ut dictum est. Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset principium et finis et ratio exemplaris.
1. Philosophers Following Darkness
2. God. .. divided the light from the darkness in order that what had been said of the angelsf could also be said of the philosophers. But why have some of them followed darkness? Because of this: although all could see the first cause as the universal principle and universal end, they had different opinions concerning the means. £ For some denied that exemplars of things existed in this cause: the leader of these seems to have been Aristotle who, in the beginning and the end of his Metaphysics, and in many other places, strongly condemns the ideas of Plato. Wherefore he says that God knows only Himself, and does not need the knowledge of any other thing, and produces [not as an Idea, but] as the desired and loved [Reality]. But this supposes that He knows nothing, or no particular thing. Therefore Aristotle is the principle assailant of Platonic ideas in his "Ethics" where he says that the supreme good cannot be an Idea. And the reasons he adduces are worthless, and the commentator answers them. 2. Divisit tamen Deus lucem a tenebris , ut, sicut dictum est de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sunt? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium principium, omnium finem, in medio tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse exemplaria rerum; quorum princeps videtur fuisse Aristoteles, qui et in principio Metaphysicae et in fine et in multis aliis locis exsecratur ideas Platonis. Unde dicit, quod Deus solum novit se et non indiget notitia alicuius alterius rei et movet ut desideratum et amatum. Ex hoc ponunt, quod nihil, vel nullum particulare cognoscat. Unde illas ideas praecipuus impugnat Aristoteles et in Ethicis , ubi dicit, quod summum bonum non potest esse idea. Et nihil valent rationes suae, et Commentator solvit eas.
3. Upon this error, there follows another, that is, that God has neither foreknowledge nor providence, since He does not have within Himself a rational justification of things by which He could know them. They also say that there are no truths concerning the future except that of necessary things. And from this it follows that all things come about either by chance or by necessity. And since it is impossible that things come about by chance, the Arabs conclude to absolute necessity, that is, that these substances that move the globe are the necessary causes of all things. From this it follows that truth is hidden, that is, the truth of government of worldly things in terms of pain and glory. If, indeed, these substances are inerrant movers, nothing is supposed concerning hell or the existence of the devil: neither did Aristotle ever suppose the existence of the devil, nor happiness after this life, as it appears. Here, then, there is a threefold error: a concealment of exemplarity, of divine providence and of world government. 3. Ex isto errore sequitur alius error, scilicet quod Deus non habet praescientiam nec providentiam, ex quo non habet rationes rerum in se, per quas cognoscat. -- Dicunt etiam, quod nulla veritas de futuro est nisi veritas necessariorum; et veritas contingentium non est veritas. -- Et ex hoc sequitur quod omnia fiant a casu, vel necessitate fatali. Et quia impossibile est fieri a casu; ideo inducunt necessitatem fatalem Arabes, scilicet quod illae substantiae moventes orbem sunt causae omnium necessariae. -- Ex hoc sequitur veritas occultata, scilicet dispositionis mundialium secundum poenas et gloriam. Si enim illae substantiae movent non errantes, nihil ponitur de inferno, nec quod sit daemon; nec Aristoteles unquam posuit daemonem nec beatitudinem post hanc vitam, ut videtur. Iste est ergo triplex error, scilicet Occultatio exemplaritatis, divinae providentiae, dispositionis mundanae.
4. From this follows a threefold blindness or darkness, that is, concerning the eternity of the world, which seems to be Aristotle's thesis according to all the Greek doctors, for instance Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, the Damascene, Basil and the commentators of all the Arabs, who say that Aristotle holds this opinion, and his words are seen to mean it. Never will you find that he said that the world had a principle or a beginning: he even argues against Plato who seems to have been the only one to suppose that time began. And this [opinion of Aristotle] is contrary to the light of truth. From this follows blindness concerning the existence of a single intellect, for if the world is supposed to be eternal, one of these hypotheses must be true: that souls are infinite in number since there would be an infinite number of men; or that the soul is corruptible; or that it is transmitted from body to body; or that there is only one single intellect in all [rational beings], an error attributed to Aristotle by his commentator. From these two propositions it may be concluded that after this life there is neither happiness nor pain. 4. Ex quibus sequitur triplex caecitas vel caligo, scilicet de aeternitate mundi, ut videtur dicere Aristoteles secundum omnes doctores Graecos, ut Gregorium Nyssenum, Gregorium Nazianzenum, Damascenum, Basilium, et commentatores omnium Arabum, qui dicunt, quod Aristoteles hoc sensit, et verba sua sonare videntur. Nunquam invenies, quod ipse dicat, quod mundus habuit principium vel initium; immo redarguit Platonem, qui solus videtur posuisse, tempus incepisse. Et istud repugnat lumini veritatis. Ex isto sequitur alia caecitas de unitate intellectus, quia, si ponitur mundus aeternus, necessario aliquod istorum sequitur: vel quod animae sunt infinitae, cum homines fuerint infiniti; vel quod anima est corruptibilis; vel quod est transitio de corpore in corpus; vel quod intellectus sit unus in omnibus, qui error attribuitur Aristoteli secundum Commentatorem. Ex his duobus sequitur, quod post hanc vitam non est felicitas nec poena.
5. These men, then, fell into error and were not separated from darkness: and these are the worst errors. And they are not yet closed by the key of the bottomless pit. These are the obscurities of Egypt: although a great light had been seen in these things through earlier forms of knowledge, yet all light was put out by these errors. And some men, seeing that Aristotle had been so great in other matters and had expressed the truth so well, could not believe that in this he had not said the truth. 5. Hi ergo ceciderunt in errores nec fuerunt divisi a tenebris; et isti sunt pessimi errores. Nec adhuc clausi sunt clave putei abyssalis . Hae sunt tenebrae Aegypti ; licet enim magna lux videretur in eis ex praecedentibus scientiis, tamen omnis extinguitur per errores praedictos. Et alii videntes, quod tantus fuit Aristoteles in aliis et ita dixit veritatem, credere non possunt, quin in istis dixerit verum.
2. Eternal Light, Examplar of All Things
6. But I say that the eternal light is the exemplar of all things, and that the mind, once lifted up as was the mind of others among the noble philosophers of antiquity, is able to reach it. And in the same light, the first thing to come to the mind is the exemplar of the virtues. As Plotinus writes, "it is absurd that the exemplars of other things be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues." 6. Dico ergo, quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo primo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum. «Absurdum enim est, ut dicit Plotinus, quod exemplaria aliarum rerum sint in Deo, et non exemplaria virtutum».
7. First to appear, then, in the eternal light, are the exemplary virtues, or the exemplars of the virtues, that is, the height of purity, the beauty of clarity, the strength of power and the straightness of diffusion. Philo, "the most learned of the Jews," writes of these as a philosopher: "Vapor is from the power of God and is a certain pure emanation from the clarity of the omnipotent God; and therefore nothing sullied is found in it." Behold, the height of purity. "Brightness is from eternal light, a spotless mirror of God's majesty and an image of His goodness." And below: "This light, then, is more beautiful than the sun, and its brilliance is incomparably superior to any pattern of stars." Behold, the beauty of clarity. But where there is a mirror and an image and brightness, there is necessarily representation and beauty. "Beauty is nothing else but harmonious proportion." And here, there are proportionate relationships retraced to unity. And because this light is most beautiful, it reaches everywhere on account of its purity. 7. Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis; de quibus Philo, «disseruimus Iudaeorum», loquens ut philosophus. -- Sapientiae septimo: Vapor est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; et ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit ; ecce celsitudo puritatis. -- Candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius . Et infra: Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stellarum luci comparata invenitur prior ; ecce pulcritudo claritatis. Ubi enim est speculum et imago et candor, necessario est repraesentatio et pulcritudo. «Pulcritudo nihil aliud est quam aequalitas numerosa»; ibi autem sunt rationes numerosae ad unum reductae. Et quia est speciosissima, ideo attingit ubique propter suam munditiam.
8. From this it follows that it is also the most powerful. Hence, it is said: Wickedness prevails not over Wisdom. Indeed, she reaches from end to end mightily. Behold, the strength of power. It reaches from the summit or the supreme unto the infinite, from the intrinsic unto the extrinsic, from the first unto the last, for the center of its might is everywhere: and that is the very reason why its power is infinite. 8. Ex quo sequitur, quod sit fortissima; ideo dicitur: Sapientiam non vincit malitia. Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter ; ecce fortitudo virtutis; attingit a summo vel supremo usque ad infimum, ab intrinseco usque ad extrinsecum, a primo usque ad ultimum, quia ubique est centrum suae potentiae: ideo virtus eius est infinita.
3. Cardinal Virtues
9. And because of this, it enjoys straightness of diffusion. Behold, justice. Hence, it is written that it governs all things well. And since the author expresses himself as a philosopher and as a lover of Wisdom, he writes: Her I loved and sought after from my youth; I sought to take her for my bride and was enamored of her beauty — not only in itself, but also because, coming from her, similar properties are flowering in me. Wherefore he continues: For she teaches moderation and prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more useful for men than these. 9. Et ex hoc habet rectitudinem diffusionis; ecce iustitia; et ideo dicit: Disponit omnia suaviter . -- Et quia loquitur ut philosophus et ut amator sapientiae; ideo dicit: Hanc amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea et quaesivi sponsam mihi eam assumere et amator factus sum formae illius ; non solum propter se, sed quia ab illa in me consequenter fiunt consimiles proprietates. Unde statim post sequitur: Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus .
10. These are impressed upon the soul by the said exemplary light, and they go down into the cognitive, the affective and the operative faculties. The sincerity of temperance is marked by the height of purity; the serenity of prudence, by the beauty of clarity; the stability of constancy, by the strength of power; the sweetness of justice, by the straightness of diffusion. These are the four exemplary virtues with which the whole of Scriptures is concerned; and Aristotle felt nothing about them, in contrast with ancient and noble philosophers. 10. Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam. Ex celsitudine puritatis imprimitur sinceritas temperantiae; ex pulcritudine claritatis, serenitas prudentiae; ex fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae; ex rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae. -- Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi.
11. The same virtues are called cardinal in a threefold sense: either because through them an entrance is made toward acquiring all virtues;! or because they are principal since all virtues are contained within them; or again because it pertains to every rational aspect of human life to be directed and regulated by them in the four directions of the cardinal points of this lesser world, in imitation of the higher world, in matters of action and contemplation. 11. Cardinales dicuntur tripliciter: vel quia per ipsas est ingressus ad acquirendum omnes virtutes; vel quia sunt principales, in quibus integratur omnis virtus; vel quia omnis ratio vitae humanae habet dirigi et regulari per eas in quatuor cardinibus mundi minoris, ad similitudinem mundi maioris, quantum ad activam et contemplativam.
12. The Philosopher says that "virtue is an intermediate point between two extremes, as the wise man will prescribe." It consists, indeed, in the quality of intermediateness. According to Augustine, in his book on Ethics, virtue is nothing else than a proper measure. Prudence finds this proper measure, so that you do not go too far in anything, but remain close to the center. Hence prudence is the driver of the virtues. Wherefore prudence says: I have found the proper measure; and temperance acts as a watchman and says: I too wanted this; and justice acts as a distributor, willing not only for itself, but also for the other; and because many adversities occur after that, fortitude acts as a defender, lest the proper measure be lost. 12. Philosophus dicit, quod «virtus est medium duarum extremitatum, secundum quod sapiens determinabit»; est enim in medietate consistens. Virtus enim secundum Augustinum, in libro De moribus, non est aliud quam modus. Hunc modum prudentia invenit, ut in omnibus non excedas, sed circa centrum consistas. Unde prudentia auriga est virtutum. Unde dicit prudentia: ego inveni modum; et temperantia custodit et dicit: et hoc volebam ego; iustitia distribuit, ut non tantum velit sibi, sed et alteri; et quia postmodum multiplices adversitates eveniunt, fortitudo defendit, ne perdatur modus.
13. Again, these virtues are called cardinal in the second place because in terms of action the integrating virtues are received [from them]. They consist in modifying, through the addition of circumstances; rectifying—for there is a right reason which leads to the end and is coequal with the laws, ordinating, and stabilizing. A virtue! is so called because it is the strength of the mind for the performance of good and the avoidance of evil. Temperance modifies, prudence rectifies, justice ordinates, and fortitude stabilizes. And each one of them is dependent upon the others. For temperance must be prudent, justice strong, while prudence must be sober, just and strong, etc. Gregory writes: "How can a man be strong unless he is prudent?" Foolhardy is he who attempts what is beyond his strength. And so, the virtues are interrelated. 13. Item, secundo dicuntur cardinales, quia secundum actus accipiuntur integrantes virtutes, qui sunt quatuor: modificare per appositionem circumstantiarum, rectificare -- est enim recta ratio ducens in finem, coaequans legibus --, ordinare, stabilire. Ab hoc dicitur virtus, quia est robur mentis ad bonum faciendum et malum evitandum. Temperantia modificat, prudentia rectificat, iustitia ordinat, fortitudo stabilit. Et omnes se circumincedunt. Oportet enim, quod temperantia sit prudens, iustitia fortis; item, quod prudentia sit sobria, iusta et fortis etc. Gregorius: Quomodo potest esse fortis, nisi sit prudens? Temerarius est enim qui aggreditur quod super vires est; et ideo virtutes sunt connexae.
14. Finally, they are called cardinal in the third sense, for the whole of human life is directed along these four axes. Likewise, the sun has four aspects related to four parts of the world, East, South, North and West, in which it has four properties. Indeed, all life proceeds from the sun: in the East, it purifies, in the South, it gives light, in the North, it stabilizes, and in the West, it reconciles. So also the Sun of Justice places the sincerity of temperance in the East of the soul, the clarity of prudence in the South, the stability of constancy in the North and the sweetness of justice in the West. And in the Apocalypse, John explains in the same way the four sides of the city in relation to the four [cardinal] virtues; and so also were the tribes arranged around the Meeting Tent. 14. Item, tertio modo dicuntur cardinales, quia omnis vita hominis his quatuor cardinibus gubernatur; sicut sol habet quatuor aspectus ad quatuor partes mundi, scilicet orientem, meridiem, aquilonem, occidentem, in quibus habet quatuor proprietates. A sole autem omnis vita: in oriente purificat, in meridie illuminat, in aquilone stabilit, in occidente conciliat. Sic Sol iustitiae in oriente mentis ponit sinceritatem temperantiae, in meridie claritatem prudentiae, in aquilone stabilitatem constantiae, in occidente suavitatem iustitiae. -- Et hoc modo in Apocalypsi Ioannes describit quatuor latera civitatis secundum quatuor virtutes cardinales; et ordinabantur etiam tribus iuxta tabernaculum.
a. Temperance
15. Temperance, which is from the East, is described as follows by Tullius: "Temperance is firm and measured dominion of reason over passion and over other movements of the soul that are not righteous." Its parts are sobriety as regards taste, chastity as regards touch, and modesty as regards the other senses. The theologians call this modesty "discipline." 15. Temperantia, quae est ab oriente, sic describitur a Tullio: «Temperantia est rationis in libidinem aliosque animi motus non rectos firma et moderata dominatio». Partes eius sunt sobrietas in gustu, castitas in tactu, modestia in ceteris sensibus; quam modestiam vocant theologi disciplinam.
b. Prudence
16. The serenity of prudence, which is from the South, is described as follows: "Prudence is the knowledge of good and evil things, and the distinction between them. Its parts are memory, intelligence and providence." For prudence is concerned with present, past, and future things. 16. Serenitas prudentiae est a meridie, quae sic describitur: «Prudentia est bonorum et malorum scientia et utrorumque discretio, cuius partes sunt memoria, intelligentia, providentia». Prudentia enim est de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris.