Collation 4 - Collations on the Hexaemeron — Bonaventure
English Latin
A. First Treatise on the First Vision, Which is by Means of Understanding Naturally Given
400 First Treatise on the First Vision, Which Is by Means of Understanding Naturally Given COLLATIO IV DE VISIONE PRIMA, QUAE EST INTELLIGENTIAE PER NATURAM INDITAE TRACTATIO PRIMA
1. God Said to See Because Because He Makes Us See
2. Truth is the Light of the Soul
1. GOD saw that the light was good. God separated the light from the darkness, etc. After every one of the works of the six days, with the exception of the second, it is said: God saw that it was good. And at the end: God saw that all He had made was very good. God is said to see, because He makes us see. The first vision of the soul is by means of understanding naturally given. Hence in the Psalm: The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us. And here all the difficulties of philosophy could be explained. The philosophers have offered nine sciences and promised a tenth: contemplation.! But many philosophers, while attempting to avoid the darkness of error, have themselves become involved in major errors. While professing to be wise, they have become fools. Because they boasted of their knowledge, these philosophers have become the likes of Lucifer. With the Egyptians was the densest darkness, but with Your saints was the greatest light. All those who properly followed the Law of Nature, the patriarchs, the prophets, and the philosophers, were the sons of light. Truth is the light of the soul. This light never fails. Indeed, it shines so powerfully upon the soul that this soul cannot possibly believe it to be non-existing, or abstain from expressing it, without an inner contradiction. For if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist: and so something is true. And if something is true, it is true that truth exists. Hence if truth does not exist, truth exists! As Esdras says, truth overcomes everything . 1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris etc. In omnibus operibus sex dierum praeterquam secundae dictum est: Vidit Deus, quod esset bonum ; et in fine dicit: Vidit Deus cuncta, quae fecerat, et erant valde bona . Videre dicitur Deus, quia videre nos facit. Prima visio animae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae. Unde dicit Psalmus: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine . Et hic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt; dicentes enim, se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt ; superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptios densissimae tenebrae erant, sed Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux. Omnes, qui fuerunt in lege naturae, ut Patriarchae, Prophetae, philosophi, filii lucis fuerunt. -- Lux animae veritas est; haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat: quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritatem non esse: ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est, veritatem esse: ergo si veritas non est, veritas est. Super omnia enim praevalet veritas , ut dicitur in Esdra.
2. Now, this light sends out three primary radiations, hence in Ecclesiasticus: The sun, three times as much, burneth the mountains. There is, indeed, a truth of things, a truth of signs or words and a truth of behavior. The truth of things is indivision between existence and essence, the truth of words is equality between expression and understanding, the truth of behavior is the rectitude of a morally good life. And these three are the three parts of philosophy which the philosophers did not invent, since they are: but because they already existed in the order of truth, they became the concern of the soul, as Augustine explains. 2. Emittit autem haec lux tres radios primos; unde in Ecclesiastico: Tripliciter sol exurens montes . Est enim veritas rerum, veritas signorum seu vocum et veritas morum. Veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, veritas sermonum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Et istae sunt tres partes philosophiae, quas philosophi non invenerunt, ut essent; sed quia iam secundum veritatem essent, in anima adverterunt, secundum Augustinum.
3. This threefold radiation may be considered from the viewpoint of the originating principle, from that of the receiving subject, and from that of the object in which it terminates. For it concerns the originating principles in terms of the three causes: the primary (efficient), the exemplar (formal), and the final: For from Him and through Him and unto Him are all things. Hence truth indicates that our mind is carried by a natural inclination to the supreme Truth in that it is the cause of being, the reason of understanding and the norm of life. From the cause of being comes forth the truth of things; from the reason of understanding, the truth of words; from the norm of life, the truth of moral behavior. 3. Haec triplex veritas consideratur ex parte principii originantis, ex parte subiecti suscipientis et ex parte obiecti terminantis. Respicit autem originans principium in ratione triplicis causae: originantis, exemplantis et terminantis; nam ex ipso, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*. Ergo veritas indicat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad Veritatem, secundum quod est «causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi»: secundum causam essendi, veritas rerum; secundum rationem intelligendi, veritas vocum; secundum ordinem vivendi, veritas morum.
4. On the part of the soul [the receiving subject], every radiation of truth over our power of understanding comes about in one of three ways: it shines upon it absolutely, and then refers to things to be seen; or in relation to the interpretative faculty, and then consists in the truth of words; or in relation to the affective or motive faculty, and then it is the truth of things to be done. 4. Ex parte autem animae omnis irradiatio veritatis super intelligentiam nostram fit tripliciter: aut fit super ipsam absolute, et sic pertinet ad notitiam rerum speculandarum; aut in comparatione ad interpretativam, et sic est veritas vocum; aut in comparatione ad affectivam et motivam, et sic est veritas operabilium.
5. It is the same as regards the object. Everything that exists depends upon essence, reason, or will. The first leads to the knowledge of things, the second to the knowledge of words, and the third to the knowledge of behavior. Hence, in relation to the principle, to the subject, and to the object, there is in the soul a threefold radiation of truth through which the soul may be lifted up to eternal matters and also to the cause of all. But if the spice of faith is „ added, things become easier: the cause of being is then attributed to the Father, the reason of understanding to the Son, and the norm of life to the Holy Spirit. 5. Ex parte obiecti sic. Omne, quod est, aut est a natura, aut a ratione, aut a voluntate. Secundum primam est notitia, quae est de rebus, secundo modo de sermonibus, tertio modo de moribus. -- Ergo secundum principium, subiectum et obiectum est triplex radius veritatis in anima, per quem anima possit elevari ad perpetua, et etiam ad causam omnium; sed si addatur condimentum fidei, tunc facilius; ut causa essendi attribuatur Patri, ratio intelligendi Filio, ordo vivendi Spiritui sancto.
6. In so far as the vision of understanding naturally given is turned toward things, it is truth. But the soul wants the whole world to be described within itself. Now the world may be considered in three ways: in terms of essence, quantity, and nature. And so this radiation leads to the study of hidden differences between quiddities, to the manifest proportions of numbers, and to the properties containing a mixture of both which are found in natures. The consideration of natures is mixed, for at times it concerns causes, which are hidden, for instance, why is fire warm, why is this herb spicy, for they have such qualities from their species which is hidden. At other times, it concerns quality, or again quantity and the influence of other bodies which are sometimes visible and at other times hidden. 6. Visio ergo intelligentiae per naturam inditae, ut convertitur ad res, est veritas. Vult autem anima totum mundum describi in se. Mundus consideratur tripliciter: quantum ad essentiam, figuram et naturam. Iste autem radius dirigit ad quidditatum differentias occultas considerandas, ad figurarum proportiones manifestas, ad naturarum proprietates ex utroque permixtas. Naturalis permixta est consideratio, quia modo de causis, quae sunt occultae, ut quare ignis calidus, quare haec herba calida, quia hoc habent a specie sua, quae occulta est; modo de qualitate, item de quantitate et influentia corporum, quae aliquando patent, aliquando latent.
3. Six Ways of Dividing
7. There are at present six ways of dividing according to hidden differences in the quiddities: that is, into substance and accident, universal and particular, potency and act, one and many, simple and composite, cause and caused. These are six lights that prepare the soul for knowledge and valid perception. 7. Secundum quidditatum differentias occultas fit divisio sex modis ad praesens: in substantiam et accidens, in universale et particulare, in potentiam et actum, in unum et multa, in simplex et compositum, in causam et in causatum. Haec sunt sex lumina, quae disponunt animam ad sciendum et bene sentiendum.
a. Substance and Accident
8. The division into substance and accident is obvious. But what are the things that may be included in it? Here there is the greatest error. For one man says that creation does not exist. Why? Because it is impossible that accident precede substance. Now creation is an accident. Hence, etc. I say that creation, in so far as it is the receiving of an effect is not an accident, because the relation of the creature to the Creator is not accidental, but essential. Likewise, the potency of matter is not an accident of matter, but is essential to it, for "by the very fact that it exists, it does so with a disposition toward something else." Likewise, differences may be reduced to the genus, as mere privations to their fulfillment. 8. Divisio substantiae et accidentis patet; sed quaedam sunt quae reducuntur ad ista, et in his est maximus error. Dicit ille: creatio non est. Quare? Quia impossibile est, accidens praecedere substantiam; creatio autem accidens est: ergo etc. Dico, quod creatio, quae est passio, accidens non est, quia relatio creaturae ad Creatorem non est accidentalis, sed essentialis. Similiter, potentia materiae non est accidens materiae, sed essentialis, quia «hoc ipso, quod est, ad alterum est». Similiter differentiae ad genus reducuntur, ut merae privationes ad suos habitus.
b. Universal and Particular
9. The second division is into universal and particular ; and here again there is a major error. For some philosophers say that the universal is nothing, except in the spirit. Plato stated that it existed only in God; others, that it existed only in the soul. I say that there is a universal oneness related to multiplicity, another existing in multiplicity, and yet another exceeding multiplicity. The universal oneness related to multiplicity is found in the potency of matter, which is not fulfilled; the universal oneness existing in multiplicity is the common nature found in particular individuals; and the universal oneness that exceeds multiplicity exists in the soul. And so, the one related to the many, the one in the many, and the one exceeding the many exist in Eternal Art; and by means of this Art and for this reason oneness exists in reality. For it is clear that two men are similar, but not a man and a donkey; hence it is necessary that this likeness be founded and stabilized in some stable form: and not in some form existing in another individual, since it is particular; hence it must exist in something universal. Now the universal principle is not contained exclusively within the soul, but exists in the object according to the process of passing from genus into species, so that we communicate first with the substance as with the most general principle, then with the other principles, until we come in contact with the final (individual) form of a man. 9. Secunda divisio est in universale et particulare; et circa hoc est magnus error. Aliqui dicunt, quod universale nihil est nisi in anima; Plato posuit, quod esset solum in Deo; alii quod solum in anima. Isti nimis abstrahunt. -- Dico ergo, quod est universale unum ad multa, unum in multis, unum praeter multa. Unum ad multa est in potentia materiae, quod non est completum; unum in multis, ut natura communis in suis particularibus; et unum praeter multa in anima. Unum autem ad multa et unum in multis et unum praeter multa in arte aeterna sunt; per illam enim artem et rationem consistit in re. Planum est enim, quod duo homines assimilantur, et non homo et asinus: ergo necesse est, ut illa similitudo fundetur et stabiliatur in aliqua forma stabili, non quae est in altero, quia illa est particularis: ergo in aliqua universali. Ratio autem universalis non est tota in anima, sed in re secundum processum generis ad speciem, ut, communicamus primo in substantia ut in generalissimo, deinde in aliis usque ad formam hominis ultimatam.
c. Potency and Act
10. The third division is into potency and act , and here there are many errors. For some philosophers say that act adds nothing to potency except a manner of being, that it stands in the same relationship to it as complete stands to incomplete. We are not speaking here of purely passive potency, but of that which proceeds to act. For since in every creature there is both active and passive potency, these two potencies must be founded on different principles within the object. Now this is the power of that potency which is the seminal reason: sometimes it adds a part of being or essence, as for instance over and above the principle "body" it adds "living" in relation to a given object, but in such a way that, while the attribute "living" is something in itself, it is ordained to sensitivity. And so, over and above "living," the seminal reason or potency adds "sensible," and so forth until the level of individual man is attained. It is the same with the potencies of the soul: for as the quadrangle has one more angle than the triangle, and the pentagon one more than the quadrangle, so "sensitive" is added to "vegetative" and "rational" to "sensitive." But sometimes the seminal reason adds nothing more than a manner of being, if for instance it turns oneness in potency into oneness in act; it adds only a manner of being, for the "one" is not joined to matter unqualifiedly, but to matter having life rooted in itself as a potency, Hence it is unsound to propose that the final form is added to prime matter without something that is a disposition or potency towards it, or without any other intermediate form 4 10. Tertia divisio est potentiae et actus; et hic sunt multi errores; Dicunt quidam, quod actus nihil addit super potentiam nisi modum essendi secundum completum et incompletum. Non loquimur hic de potentia pure passiva, sed de illa quae procedit ad actum. Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa sit coniuncta potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia rei. De potentia, quae est ratio seminalis, haec est vis: quia potentia talis super actum aliquando addit partem essendi, vel essentiae, ut, super rationem corporis addit animatum secundum rem, pro eo quod animatio aliquid est, ordinatum tamen ad sensibile; et super animatum addit sensibile, et sic usque ad hominem. Sic similiter de potentiis animae, quod sicut tetragonus addit unum angulum ad trigonum, et pentagonus ad tetragonum; sic sensitivum ad vegetativum, et rationale ad sensitivum. -- Aliquando autem addit solum modum essendi, ut, si de uno in potentia fiat unum in actu, addit solum modum essendi, quia unum non coniungitur materiae simpliciter, sed materiae habenti vitam in potentia radicali. -- Unde insanum est dicere, quod ultima forma addatur materiae primae sine aliquo, quod sit dispositio vel in potentia ad illam, vel nulla forma interiecta.
d. One and the Many
11. The fourth division is into the one and the many, and there are here a number of errors. Some philosophers claim that everything is one: as there is one matter, there is also one radical form, which is then multiplied and varied only through different manners of being. And this is nothing more than to say that the proposition: man is a donkey is true in itself but false by accident. Hence you should understand that rational and irrational differ not only accidentally, but also essentially. 11. Quarta divisio est in unum et multa, et de illa multi sunt errores. Quidam dixerunt, quod omnia sint unum; ut, sicut una est materia, ita una forma radicalis, et postmodum multiplicatur secundum modum essendi et variatur. Sed hoc nihil aliud est dicere, quam quod illa propositio: homo est asinus, sit vera per se, falsa per accidens. Unde intellige, quod rationale et irrationale non solum differunt per accidens, sed etiam essentialiter.
e. Simple and Composite
12. The fifth division is into simple and composite , and here also there are many errors, as for instance to claim that a certain creature is simple, for then it would be pure act, which is an attribute of God alone, and it is most dangerous to attribute to a creature what belongs to God. Hence, it is less dangerous to say that an angel is composite, even if it is not true, than to say that it is simple: for I attribute composition to the angel because I refuse to attribute to it what belongs to God, and this out of respect for the reverence I have toward God. But, in truth, it does seem to be composite, for Boethius says: "Form cannot be a subject." So if the angel be pure form, nothing can happen to it in the accidental order, neither joy nor sadness. 12. Quinta divisio est in simplex et compositum; et hic etiam sunt multi errores, ut dicere, quod aliqua creatura sit simplex; quia tunc esset purus actus, quod est solius Dei; et attribuere quod est Dei creaturae periculosum est. Minus ergo est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit compositus, etiam si verum non sit, quam quod sit simplex; quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod est Dei, propter pietatem, quam habeo ad reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius: «Forma subiectum esse non potest»: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc, nec laetitia nec tristitia.
f. Cause and Caused