Chapter III.
On grace, insofar as it is a remedy for sin.
Concerning grace, insofar as it is a remedy against sin, these things are to be held: that free will, although it is "most powerful under God," can nevertheless fall into sin by itself, but can in no way rise again without the aid of divine grace, which is called making pleasing.
That grace, however, although it is a sufficient remedy against sin, is nevertheless not infused into an adult unless the consent of free will is present. From which it is gathered that four things concur for the justification of the ungodly, namely: the infusion of grace, the expulsion of guilt, contrition, and the movement of free will. - Guilt is therefore expelled by the gift of God, not by free will, yet not without free will. For it belongs to gratuitously given grace to recall free will from evil and to arouse it to good; and it belongs to free will to consent or to dissent; and it belongs to the one consenting to receive grace; and it belongs to the one receiving it to cooperate with it, so that one may at last arrive at salvation.
Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle, by the very fact that it is first and most powerful, is the cause of all things that come about in the universe except sins, which are "transgressions of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commandments," it has nothing rebellious, injurious, and offensive to itself except sin, which, by contemning the precept of God and turning us away from the unchangeable good, offends God, deforms free will, destroys the gratuitous gift, and binds to eternal punishment. Since therefore the deformation of the image and the destruction of grace is as it were an annihilation in the being of moral life and gratuitous life; since the offense against God is to be weighed as great as He Himself is; since the liability to eternal punishment holds the character of the infinite: it is impossible for man to rise from guilt unless he is recreated in gratuitous life, unless the offense is remitted, and the eternal punishment released. He alone, therefore, who was the creative principle is also the recreative principle, namely the eternal Word of the Father, which is Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men , who because He creates all things from nothing, therefore creates by Himself alone without any intermediary.
But because He recreates, reforming what was deformed through the vice of guilt by the habit of grace and justice, absolving what was bound to punishment through condign satisfaction; hence it is that He restores us, by sustaining punishment for us in the assumed nature and by infusing reformative grace, which, since it joins us to its origin, makes us members of Christ; and through this makes the sinful soul, which had been an enemy of God, a brothel of the devil, and a slave of sin, into a bride of Christ, a temple of the Holy Spirit, and a daughter of the eternal Father: all of which comes about through the gratuitous and condescending infusion of the gratuitous gift.
Again, since God so reforms that He does not weaken the laws implanted in nature, He therefore so bestows this grace upon free will that He nevertheless does not compel it, but its consent remains free. And therefore, in order that fault be expelled, it is necessary not only that grace be introduced, but also that free will in adults—in adults, I say, because in infants the faith of the Church and the merit of Christ suffice, and their incapacity excuses them—it is necessary, I say, that it conform itself to the expulsion of fault through the detestation of all sins, which we call contrition; it is also necessary that it conform itself to the introduction of grace through complacence in and acceptance of the divine gift, which we call the movement of free will. And thus it is necessary that these four concur for the justification of the ungodly.
Finally, because the predisposition toward the completive form ought to be conformed to it: in order that free will dispose itself toward sanctifying grace, it needs the aid of gratuitously given grace; and because it belongs to grace not to compel free will but to go before it, and it belongs to both together to proceed into act: hence it is that in our justification the act of free will and of grace concur, harmoniously indeed and in an ordered manner, such that it belongs to gratuitously given grace to arouse free will; but it belongs to free will to consent to or dissent from this arousal; and it belongs to the one consenting to prepare itself for sanctifying grace, because this is to do what lies within oneself; and to one thus disposed, sanctifying grace is to be infused, with which free will can cooperate, if it wills, and then it merits; or it can oppose it through sin, and then it demerits. If therefore it cooperates with it unto the end, it merits to attain eternal salvation.
It is therefore true what Augustine says, that "He who created you without you will not justify you without you."
It is also true that it is not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy.
It is also true that no one can boast of merits, because God crowns nothing in us except his own gifts. For God has reserved to himself the gifts of grace to be freely bestowed, so that man may learn not to be ungrateful nor to glory in himself as though he had not received, but to glory in the Lord. — It is also true that, although free choice cannot of itself fulfill the law nor produce grace within itself, it is nevertheless inexcusable if it does not do what it can, because grace freely given is always at hand for admonition, with the aid of which it can do what lies within itself: which having been done, it may have grace making acceptable: which having been obtained, it may fulfill the divine law and do the will of God: which having been done, it may at last arrive at eternal beatitude on account of meritorious works, which are wholly from grace, and wholly also from free choice, although principally from grace: because, as Augustine says, "grace is compared to free choice as a rider to a horse," which rider indeed directs, leads, and conducts free choice to the harbor of eternal felicity, exercising us in the works of perfect virtue according to the gift of sevenfold grace itself.
Ch. IV.
On the branching of grace into the habits of the virtues.
Third, it remains to treat of grace in comparison to the habits of the virtues, concerning which three things must be considered. The first is how one grace branches into the habits of the virtues; the second is how it branches into the habits of the gifts; the third is how it branches into the habits of the beatitudes.
Concerning the branching of grace into the habits of the virtues, therefore, these things must be held: that although there is one grace making the soul pleasing to God, nevertheless there are seven gratuitous virtues by which human life is governed: three indeed theological, namely faith, hope, and charity; and four cardinal, namely prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, which in one way is a common and general virtue, and in another way special and proper.
Now these seven virtues, although they are distinct and have their own excellences, are nevertheless connected and equal to one another in the same subject; and although they are gratuitous, informed by grace, they can nevertheless become unformed through fault, charity alone excepted, and again be informed through penance, when grace arrives, which is the origin, end, and form of the virtuous habits.
Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, just as the productive principle, by its supreme perfection in giving life to nature, gives not only living with respect to first act, but also with respect to second act, which is operating, so it is necessary that the reparative principle bestow life on the spirit in gratuitous being, both with respect to being and with respect to operating. And since for one living being according to one primary life there are many vital operations for the perfect manifestation of that life — since acts are diversified by their objects, and the diversity of acts requires a distinction of habits — hence it is that although there is one vivifying grace, it must nevertheless necessarily branch into various habits on account of various operations. And since certain moral works are primary, such as believing; certain ones intermediate, such as understanding the things believed; and certain ones final, such as seeing the things understood; and in the first the soul is rectified, in the second it is made ready, in the third it is perfected: therefore grace making one pleasing to God branches into the habits of the virtues, whose role is to rectify the soul; into the habits of the gifts, whose role is to make ready the soul; and into the habits of the beatitudes, whose role is to perfect the soul.
Again, since the perfect rectitude of the soul requires that it be rectified according to its twofold face, namely the superior and the inferior, and with respect to the end, and with respect to those things which are directed toward the end: Therefore it is necessary that the soul, with respect to the superior face in which the image of the eternal Trinity consists, be rectified through the three theological virtues, so that, just as the image of creation consists in a trinity of powers with a unity of essence, so the image of re-creation consists in a trinity of habits with a unity of grace, through which the soul is rightly borne toward the supreme Trinity according to the three things appropriated to the three persons; so that faith directs toward the supremely true by believing and assenting, hope toward the supremely arduous by relying and expecting, charity toward the supremely good by desiring and loving.
It is also necessary that with respect to the inferior face the soul be rectified through the four cardinal virtues. For prudence rectifies the rational power, fortitude the irascible, temperance the concupiscible, while justice rectifies all these powers in relation to another.
And because that other can determinately be one's neighbor, the same person can also be compared to himself as to another, and it can also be God himself: hence it is that justice is said to encompass all the powers. It is also called not only a cardinal virtue, but also a general one, comprehending the rectitude of the whole soul, since it is called "rectitude of the will." Whence it comprehends not only the virtues ordering toward one's neighbor, such as equity and liberality: but also toward oneself, such as penitence and innocence; and also toward God, such as latria, piety, and obedience.
Finally, since all rectitude of the virtues according to their gratuitous being flows from grace as from its origin and root: and according to their meritorious being is related to charity as to its origin, form, and end: hence it is that the other gratuitous virtues with respect to their habits are connected and with respect to their meritorious acts are equal.
Hence it is also that the other habits of the virtues can be unformed, with the sole exception of charity, which is the form of the virtues. For when they are possessed without grace and charity, in which the life of the virtues consists, then they are unformed. But when grace is infused upon them, then they are formed and adorned and become acceptable to God: just as colors without light are invisible, but when light comes upon them, they become luminous, beautiful, and pleasing to sight. Whence just as from light and colors one thing comes to be in the character of a motive power, and one light suffices to illuminate many colors: so from grace and unformed habits, when they are formed, one thing comes to be according to the character of the meritorious and the gratuitous: and one grace nonetheless suffices for the formation and gratification of diverse habits.