Chapter VIII.
On the origin of actual sins.
After what has been said concerning the transmission of original sin, some things must be said concerning the origin of actual sin.
Concerning the origin therefore of actual sin, these things are to be held in summary: that actual sin draws its origin from the free will of each person through suggestion, delight, consent, and action, according to that passage in James 1: Each one is tempted, being drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; then concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin; and sin, when it is consummated, begets death.
If, however, suggestion and delight stop short of consent, it is a venial sin. — But if consent and action follow in those things which are prohibited by divine law, the sin is a consummated mortal sin.
But if it happens in a middle way, such that there is consent without action, either because one wills to proceed to action but cannot — then the will is reckoned as the deed, nor is one less culpable than if one were caught in the very act; or because one does not will to proceed to action, but wills to take inward pleasure in the delight — and then the woman eats, but not the man: and although the sin is not fully consummated, it is nevertheless to be counted among mortal sins, because when the woman eats, the whole man deserves to be condemned; which is to be understood especially in carnal sins.
Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this. Since sin denotes a withdrawal of the will from the First Principle, insofar as the will is made to be moved by Him, according to Him and for His sake; every sin is a disorder of the mind or will, around which virtue and vice are naturally found. Actual sin, therefore, is an actual disorder of the will. Now this disorder is either so great that it destroys the order of justice; and in this way it is called mortal sin, because it is apt to take away life, by separating the soul from God, through whom the just soul is given life; or it is so slight that it does not destroy that order, but disturbs it in some respect; and then it is called venial sin, because from it we can quickly obtain pardon, since through it grace is not taken away, nor is divine enmity incurred. Now the order of justice is that the unchangeable good be preferred to the changeable good, that the virtuous good be preferred to the useful, that the will of God be preferred to one's own will, and that the judgment of right reason preside over sensuality. And since the law of God commands this order and forbids the opposite; when the changeable good is preferred to the eternal, and the useful good is preferred to the virtuous, and our will is preferred to the divine will, and the sensual appetite is preferred to right reason: then mortal sin is committed, of which Ambrose says that it is "a transgression of the divine law and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Now this is committed whether what the divine law commands is omitted or what it forbids is done: from which arises a twofold kind of sin, namely omission and commission .
But when the changeable good is loved more than is due, yet is not preferred to the unchangeable; and utility is not preferred to virtue; and our will is loved more than is due, yet not preferred to the divine will; and the flesh desires inordinately, yet is not preferred to the judgment of right reason: then it is not mortal but venial, because, although this is beside the law, it is not directly against the law. Now the sensual appetite is not preferred to right reason unless reason consents to it: and therefore mortal sin is not committed without consent.
If, however, sensuality is moved in a disordered way, since that disorder inclines toward evil, even though reason does not consent: it is still some sin, because in some way it injures the order of justice. — And because in the state of innocence sensuality was not moved except according to the motion of reason: therefore, while man stood upright, there could be no venial sin there. — But now, because sensuality rebels against reason, whether we will it or not: therefore we necessarily commit some venial sin through first movements, which, although they can be avoided individually and one by one, nevertheless cannot all be guarded against; because they are sins in such a way that they are also punishments of sin: and therefore they are rightly called venial, because by this very fact they are worthy of pardon.
But because reason is not compelled to consent to these things, if after the sense of delight there is consent to the deed: then there is full consent, and thereby sin is consummated, because it has reached the man, that is, the supreme part of reason, upon which the fullness of consent depends.
But because there is consent not only to the deed, but also to the delight, in which the inferior portion follows sensuality: therefore, if in sensual delight reason succumbs to sensuality, the woman obeys the serpent, and thereby there occurs a subversion of right order, and thus a subversion of justice; on account of which mortal sin is committed, although less grave, which is imputed not only to the woman, but also to the man, by whom the woman ought to have been restrained and held back, lest she obey the serpent. - And thus it is clear that in the perpetration of every actual sin there occurs a certain imitation of the first sin, according to the explanation of the preeminent Doctor, namely Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity.