Chapter X.
On the origin and quality of penal sins.
Concerning penal sins, this must be held: that although the evil of fault and the evil of punishment are different species of evil, nevertheless certain things are sins in such a way that they are also the punishment of sin.
For in a special manner, those are called sins and punishments of sin which have joined to them sorrow and sadness, such as envy, sloth, and the like.
Less specially, those are so called which have joined to them either the mere depravation of nature or disgrace, as are those with respect to which the sinner is said to be given over to a reprobate mind .
But generally, sins which "are between the first apostasy and the final punishment of hell can be called both sins and the punishment of sin," according to what Gregory says, that crimes are punished by crimes.
Although the same thing may be called both sin and the punishment of sin, it must nevertheless be held that every punishment insofar as it is punishment is just and from God; but no fault is just nor from God, but only from the free choice of the will.
Now punishment which is merely punishment is inflicted by God; but that which is fault, or inclining toward fault, is either contracted or committed.
The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: since evil denotes a departure from the first principle by the fact that it harms the good, and it does not harm the good except by taking something away from the good, and the good consists in measure, species, and order, there is no evil that is not corruptive of measure, species, and order. Now order is twofold, namely the order of nature and the order of justice. The order of nature is in the natural good, the order of justice in the moral good; and because the natural good is in every nature, while the moral good must consist in the will, therefore the order of nature is in every nature, but the order of justice consists in the elective will. And because the will "is an instrument moving itself," while nature is not at all, hence it is that the order of justice is an order not only made but also making; while the order of nature is an order made. Since, therefore, evil can deprive the order of justice and the order of nature, hence it is that evil is twofold, namely of fault and of punishment.
Again, because the order of justice is a voluntary order, hence it is that "the evil of fault is a voluntary condition, while the evil of punishment is an involuntary condition."
Finally, because the order of justice, which is in the will, is an order that is making, therefore "the evil of fault, which is its privation, is the evil that we do, and the evil of punishment is the evil that we suffer." And because there is no suffering unless action naturally precedes it, nor any action which some suffering does not follow, hence it is that there is no punishment without a preceding merit of fault, nor is there any fault that is not accompanied by some punishment.
And since what we do is from ourselves, while what we suffer can be from ourselves and from others, namely from a superior or an inferior cause: therefore, although every fault is from ourselves, not every punishment is from ourselves; rather, some is enacted by us, some inflicted, and some contracted.
And because it is just that he who does what he ought not should suffer what he ought, therefore every punishment insofar as it is punishment is just and from divine providence, because it is ordered to fault and is itself the ordering of that fault.
But because that suffering can be through the removal of a natural good, or of a moral good together with a natural one: hence it is that some punishment is merely punishment, while some is both punishment and fault: because a moral good, which is justice, is not removed except through injustice, which is fault.
The first punishment, therefore, is from God both insofar as it is punishment and insofar as it is what it is: from God, I say, not as instituting, but as vindicating. The second, however, since it is fault, insofar as it is what it is, is not from God, but only with respect to its ordering. And this itself is either enacted, if it follows upon actual sin, or contracted, if it follows upon original sin.
If, therefore, evil is taken properly, insofar as it is a privation of a natural good and an involuntary affliction and an evil that we suffer: thus it does not coincide with the evil of fault in the same subject, although it is annexed to it. But if it is taken broadly, so that whatever we suffer is called evil, whether from ourselves or from elsewhere, whether in nature or in the will: thus they coincide in the same subject, but not to the same end, or according to the same aspect: because what is fault in itself is called the punishment of a preceding fault; or: what is fault by reason of action is said to be punishment by reason of suffering.
And thus it is clear how, to what extent, and why something is simultaneously called sin and the punishment of sin.