Chapter IX.
On the production of man with respect to the spirit.
After corporeal and incorporeal nature, some things must be said about the nature composed of both, first from the part of the mind, second from the part of the flesh, third from the part of the whole man.
Concerning the rational soul, therefore, these things are to be held in summary according to sacred doctrine, namely that it is a form having being, living, understanding, and exercising freedom. A form indeed having being not from itself nor from the divine nature, but brought into being by God from nothing through creation.
A form, moreover, that is living: not from an extrinsic nature, but by itself: not with a mortal life, but with a perpetual life.
A form, truly, that is understanding not only created essence, but also the "creative essence," to whose image it was made through memory, understanding, and will.
A form, also, exercising freedom, because it is always free from coercion: from misery, however, and from fault it was free in the state of innocence, although not in the state of fallen nature; this freedom from coercion, moreover, is nothing other than the faculty of will and reason, which are the principal powers of the soul.
The reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle is most blessed and most benevolent, therefore by its supreme benevolence it communicates its blessedness to the creature, not only to the spiritual and proximate, but also to the corporeal and remote. To the corporeal and remote, however, it communicates mediately, because "this is the law of divinity, that the lowest things are led back to the highest through intermediaries." And therefore it made not only the angelic and separated spirit capable of beatitude, but also the conjoined spirit, namely the human. The rational soul is therefore a form capable of beatitude. And because to arrive at the reward of beatitude is not glorious except through merit: nor does it come about that one merits, except in that which is done voluntarily and freely: therefore it was necessary that freedom of judgment be given to the rational soul through the removal of all coercion; because it belongs to the nature of the will that it can in no way be compelled, although through fault it is made wretched and a servant of sin.
Again, because the form capable of beatitude is capable of God through memory, understanding, and will: and this is to be in the image of the Trinity on account of unity in essence and trinity in powers: therefore it was necessary that the soul be understanding God and all things, and through this be marked with the image of God.
And because nothing blessed can lose blessedness, nothing could be capable of beatitude unless it were incorruptible and immortal: it was necessary that the rational soul be living with immortal life by its own nature.
Finally, because everything that is beatifiable by another and immortal is mutable with respect to well-being and incorruptible with respect to being: therefore the soul is neither from itself nor of the divine nature, because it is mutable; nor produced from something nor generated through nature, because it is immortal and incorruptible: and thus this form cannot be brought into being through generation, because everything naturally generable is naturally corruptible. - From these things it is apparent how the end of beatitude — the ordination of the soul itself to beatitude — imposes the necessity of the aforesaid conditions.
Moreover, since as beatifiable it is immortal, therefore, when it is united to a mortal body, it can be separated from it: and on this account it is not only a form, but also a this something: and therefore it is united to the body not only as a perfection, but also as a mover: and thus it perfects through its essence that which it likewise moves through its power. And since it gives not only being, but also life and sensation and understanding: therefore it has a vegetative, sensitive, and intellective power, such that through the vegetative power it generates, nourishes, and augments: it generates as regards substance, nourishes as regards quality, and augments as regards quantity.
Through the sensitive power it apprehends sensible things, retains what has been apprehended, and composes and divides what has been retained: it apprehends indeed through the exterior sensitive power, which is fivefold according to its correspondence to the five principal bodies of the world; it retains through memory, composes and divides through the imagination, which is the first collative power. - Through the intellective power, however, it discerns the true, flees evil, and desires the good: it discerns the true through the rational power, repels evil through the irascible power, and desires the good through the concupiscible power.
Again, because the discernment of the true is cognition, while flight and appetite are affection: therefore the whole soul is divided into the cognitive and the affective.
Furthermore, since cognition of the true is twofold: either of the true as true, or of the true as good; and this either of the eternal, which is above the soul, or of the temporal, which is below: hence it is that the cognitive power, namely intellect and reason, is divided such that the intellect is divided into the speculative and the practical, and reason into a higher portion and a lower: which designate different offices rather than different powers.
Finally, since appetite can be borne toward something in two ways, namely according to natural instinct, or according to deliberation and judgment: hence it is that the affective power is divided into the natural will and the elective will, which is properly called the will. And since such election is indifferent to either part, therefore it proceeds from free choice.
And because this indifference arises from a preceding deliberation and an accompanying will, it follows that free choice is a faculty of reason and will, such that, as Augustine says, it comprehends all the aforesaid rational powers. For he says: "When we speak of free choice, we do not speak of a part of the soul, but assuredly of the whole." For from the concurrence of those powers — reason returning upon itself and will accompanying it — there arises the integrity of freedom, which is the principle of merit or demerit, according to the choice of good or evil.
Ch. X.
On the production of man with respect to the body.
Concerning the human body in the state of its first condition, these things are to be held according to the doctrine of the orthodox faith, namely that the body of the first man was so fashioned and from the slime of the earth formed, that nevertheless it was subject to the soul and in its own way proportionate, proportionate, I say, with respect to an equal temperament, with respect to a most beautiful and manifold organization, and with respect to uprightness of stature; subject, moreover, so that it was obedient without rebellion, was also propagating and capable of propagation without lust, was nourishable without decay, was also transformable toward complete incorruption, death not intervening; and according to this there was given to him the place of the earthly paradise as a tranquil habitation.
The woman was formed from the side of the man as a companion and help for immaculate propagation; the tree of life was also given for continual nourishment, and finally for perfect transformation through perpetual immortality.
Now the reason for understanding the aforesaid is this: because, since the first principle is most powerful, most wise, and most good in producing, and manifests this in some way in all its effects, it ought most especially to have manifested this in the last and most noble effect — such as man is, whom among the other creatures it produced last, so that in this the consummation of the divine works might most especially appear and shine forth.
Therefore, in order that the power of God might be manifested in man, he made him from natures most greatly distant, conjoined into one person and nature — such as are the body and the soul, of which one is a corporeal substance, while the other, namely the soul, is a spiritual and incorporeal substance, which in the genus of substance are most greatly distant.
But in order that the wisdom of God might be manifested therein, he made such a body that it would have proportion in its own way to the soul. Since, therefore, the body is united to the soul as to one perfecting and moving and tending upward toward beatitude ; therefore, in order that it might be conformed to the vivifying soul, it had an equal temperament, not from weight or mass, but from the equality of natural justice, which disposes toward the most noble mode of life.
But in order that it might be conformed to the soul as moving through the manifold variety of powers, it had a manifold variety of organs with the highest beauty and artfulness and flexibility; as is evident in the face and in the hand, which is the "instrument of instruments."
But in order that it might be conformed to the soul as tending upward toward heaven, it had uprightness of stature and the head raised upward, so that bodily uprightness might bear witness to mental uprightness.
Finally, so that the goodness and benevolence of God might be manifested in man, He made man without any stain or fault and without any punishment or misery. For since the First Principle is at once most good and most just; because most good, He ought not to have made man other than good, and thereby innocent and upright; because most just, He ought not to have inflicted punishment on one who had absolutely no sin: and thereby He constituted for that rational soul such a body as would be so obedient to it that there would be in it no struggle of rebellion, no proneness to concupiscence, no diminution of vigor, no corruption of death: so also it would be so conformed to the soul that, just as the soul was innocent and yet could fall into fault, so the body would be impassible and yet could fall into punishment; and therefore "it was able not to die, and it was able to die"; it was able to have sufficiency, and it was able to have want; it was able to obey the soul, and it was also able to have rebellion and struggle against it.
And for this reason, in that state the body was such that from it there would be a seminal separation for the propagation of offspring through the assistance of the female sex equally co-principiating; there would also be a consumption of nutrimental moisture through the action of heat: there would also nonetheless be a restoration through the nourishment of the trees of paradise, restored through the tree of life, that is, with the radical moisture preserved: which tree indeed had this virtue, on account of which, as Augustine says, it was not only for food but also as a Sacrament.
The incorruption and immortality of Adam's body, therefore, came principally from the soul as from that which contains and influences, from the body's good and balanced constitution as from that which disposes and receives, from the tree of life as from that which vivifies and assists, and from the governance of divine providence as from that which conserves inwardly and protects outwardly.