Chapter IV.
On the Catholic Expression of This Faith.
For the catholic expression of this faith, it must also be held, according to the teachings of the holy Doctors, that in divine things there are two modes of predicating, namely by way of substance and of relation; three modes of suppositing, namely of essence, person, and notion; four modes of signifying substance, namely by the name of essence, substance, person, and hypostasis; five modes of speaking, namely quis, qui, quot, quod and quid; and three modes of differing, namely according to a different mode of existing, according to a different mode of being related, and according to a different mode of being understood.
The reason for the aforesaid is this: since the first principle is at once most perfect and most simple, all things that belong to perfection are said of it properly and truly; but those things that belong to imperfection either are not said of it, or if they are said, they are said according to the assumption of human nature, or by way of transference. Since therefore there are ten categories, namely substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, where, when, position, and having; the last five properly pertain to corporeal or mutable things; therefore they are not attributed to God except in a transumptive and figurative manner. But the other five preceding ones are attributed to God, according to that which they express of perfection, yet in such a way that they do not impede the divine simplicity. All these categories, therefore, are the very same thing as that of which they are predicated; and thus, by comparison to the subject in which they inhere, all are said to pass into substance, with the exception, however, of relation: which, since it has a twofold comparison, namely to the subject in which it inheres, and to the term toward which it tends, in the first way passes over, lest it produce composition, and in the second way remains, so that it may produce distinction. And hence it is that "substance contains unity, and relation multiplies trinity"; and therefore there remain therein only these two different modes of predicating.
Concerning which the following rule is given: that those things which are said according to substance are said of all both singly and together and in the singular; but those things said according to relation either are not said of all, or if of several, in the plural, as related, distinct, similar, equal, on account of intrinsic relation. The name of Trinity, however, comprehends both.
And since there can be multiple relations in one person, just as there are multiple persons in one nature, therefore distinction in notion does not bring about a rending apart of person, nor does distinction of person bring about a multiplication of nature. And for this reason, not whatever belongs to the essence belongs to the notion or person, nor conversely. And hence it is that there are three modes of suppositing, concerning which the following rule is customarily given: when the essence is supposited, neither the notion nor the person is supposited; and when the notion is supposited, neither the essence nor the person is supposited; and when the person is supposited, neither the essence nor the notion is supposited, as is clear through examples.
And since there is true distinction in the supposits of substance, while the essence remains one, therefore it is necessary that substance be signified there in multiple ways, namely as communicable and incommunicable. As communicable, by the mode of abstraction through the name of essence, and by the mode of concretion through the name of substance; but as incommunicable, either as distinguishable through the name of hypostasis, or as distinguished through the name of person.
Or otherwise, namely as distinguished in any way whatsoever, and thus hypostasis; or notably and perfectly, and thus person.
Examples of these four are found in creatures: humanity, man, some man, Peter: the first designates essence, the second substance, the third hypostasis, and the fourth person.
And because in the person who is distinguished, one must consider not only the one who is distinguished, but also that by which he is distinguished—and this is the property or notion—therefore it is necessary that in the divine there be five modes of speaking and likewise of inquiring, namely who [quis], by reason of person; who [qui], by reason of hypostasis, because it designates a supposit of substance indistinctly; how many [quot], by reason of notion; what [quod], by reason of substance; what [quid] or by which [quo], by reason of essence.
And since all these modes are rooted in the unity of essence, because whatever is in God is God Himself, one and alone, they therefore do not posit any difference there, neither according to essence nor according to being. And for this reason there are only three modes of differing, namely according to modes of being or emanating, as one person differs from another person; according to modes of being related, as person and essence differ — because one person is referred to another, and therefore is distinguished, but essence is not referred to another, and therefore is not distinguished — and according to modes of understanding, as one substantial property differs from another, such as goodness and wisdom. — The first difference is the greatest that can be found in the divine: for it is in the supposits, such that one is not predicated of the other. — The second difference is lesser, because it is in the attributes: for although one can be predicated of the other, as person of essence, nevertheless something is said of the one that is not said of the other, as: person is distinguished and referred, but essence is not. — The third difference is least, because it is in the connotated. For although one is predicated of the other reciprocally, and the same thing can be said of both, nevertheless the same thing is not connoted in each case, nor is the same thing given to be understood through each. — From the first mode of differing arises the plurality of persons; from the second mode, the plurality of substantial and relative predications; from the third, the plurality of essential properties and notions, whether from eternity or from time, whether properly or transumptively, whether commonly or by appropriation. Examples of the things said are manifest. — With these things understood, it is sufficiently clear both what is to be held and how one ought to speak concerning the supreme Trinity of the divine persons.