Chapter IX.
While the heretics want to claim that the unbegotten Father, which they did not read in Scripture, should be granted to them, they reveal their eagerness for debate. However, it must be admitted that it is written, but by Arius, who is opposed by the Apostle. Their objection is turned back against themselves, and the voice of the unbegotten is also affirmed for all creatures. After explaining the reasoning of the opponents, Ambrose responds that the terms "begotten" and "unbegotten" do not signify nature, but rather quality. With the examples presented, this proves the point extensively, but in particular it is longer in that it makes it clear that the same substance can arise from different beginnings.
Now they argue that when they have read the Unbegotten Father. But if they demand that it be granted to them in the manner of dialectic, that they may use as a premise what has not been read and pretend that it has been read, they reveal that they are driven by the desire for controversy rather than the pursuit of knowledge of the truth. For in dialectic itself, if what they demand to be granted to them is not granted, they are unable to find a starting point for their argument, which they desire in order to find an approach to controversy, rather than to examine the truth. And this is the case where the dispute is more about the clever tactics of argumentation than about the investigation of truth. For this is indeed the glory of dialecticians, if they seem to conquer with words and refute the truth; and on the other hand, it is contrary to the definition of faith that truth, not words, should be weighed. In short, simple truth excludes the words of philosophers, just as it does the nets of fishermen.
Therefore, what is this assertion, where if I do not grant them the word of the uncreated, they cannot find the beginning of the assertion? So, let them demonstrate where they have read it.
He had forgotten: now I remember. It has been read, they say; for Arius said that the Father is uncreated, and the Son is begotten and created. Behold, they contend against the apostolic writings in this matter: let them contend, however, if they confess themselves to be disciples of Arius. For how can they deny the teacher whose invention they follow?
But if they say this, what Arius said: I should more justly say what the Apostle said (Ephesians 3:14). For he called the Father, not ungenerated: he called the Son, and he called him begotten Son. What I have read, I do not deny; indeed, I gladly use it: what I have not read, I should not use. But yet, what we would not do in dialectic, they may use; and perhaps they may say that because we do not read the Father as begotten like the Son, therefore we must consider him ungenerated.
This is understood, therefore it is not read. But if it is understood, neither is the Holy Spirit born read: therefore, the Spirit, because it is not born, must certainly be called uncreated according to your opinion. Therefore, if you say that the uncreated and the born cannot be of one substance; it remains that you do not deny the unity of the divine nature and substance of the Father and the Holy Spirit, because we do not read of the Father being born, nor of the Holy Spirit. For if the power of your entire argument is that the ungenerated and generated cannot be of the same nature, therefore, he who is not generated is of the same nature and substance as he who is not generated. And if you think that the Father is greater because he is not generated, is the Holy Spirit also greater than the Son?
Many and countless examples can be provided to show that something which is not generated is called ungenerated. For many have said that even the world is ungenerated, and that the matter of all things, which the Greeks call 'hyle' as if it were a material forest, is ungenerated. Therefore, they see that this word cannot have a certain prerogative of power, unless perhaps they seem to honor God with this word, by which philosophers believed the world should be considered a gift. Is the Father, therefore, begotten in such a way as the world? Far from it. Or does only this speech befit God, since God is beyond the scope of all speeches? Therefore, there is nothing precious to God in that speech, which can be common with others.
But nevertheless, however you want it, let the incomparable prerogative of this speech be, which is not designated by any authority, but is estimated by your judgment. Therefore, what advantage does this have, that you want to create a difference in nature, a difference in power between the Father and the Son from a word? Unbegotten, it says, and begotten cannot be of the same nature and substance; or, as they sometimes say, the uncreated and the created are not of the same nature. For neither do the ingenerate and inoperative make a distinction, nor do they want there to be a distinction between the begotten and the created, in such a way that they would call the Son a creature.
Therefore, they say that because the Father is the ultimate cause, that is, αἰτίαν as the Greeks say, and has surpassed all others, since he was not created from another, he is not a son; since he is indeed substance, not having a beginning or cause from elsewhere, from which he exists. And therefore, they say, there cannot be another substance like this, because all things have their cause for existence from Father God. Hence, they say it is not plausible that the Son, because he is from the Father, and does not have a cause of his own to exist, but receives it from the Father, should be similar to the Father: since the Father does not have a cause from elsewhere, but the Son, as they argue, could not have existed unless he had received this very thing from the Father to be.
And so they say that what is begotten and what is uncreated are dissimilar; as if, indeed, as I have often said elsewhere, generation is about power, not nature. For when I say what is begotten, I am expressing not a property of nature but the meaning of generation; and I will prove this with more evident examples. For if I were to say 'Son' generally, without adding whose, it could be understood as both the son of a human, and the son of wickedness, and the son of destruction, and the son of the devil, as the Scripture testifies about the Jews (John 8:44); and likewise what is in use for the offspring of a beast and the young of doves. And therefore in the appellation of sons, the expression of nature is not signified. But indeed if I desire to designate nature, I will call a man, or name a horse, or say a bird, so that nature can be understood.
So, if I want to designate divine nature, I should name the true God. But when I say Son, I indicate that he was born: when I also say Father, I declare that he has begotten. Therefore, do not make a distinction in nature, since this indicates the nature of the one who begets and the one who is begotten: indications of this kind express the quality of the substance; for there are many sons, as I said, but there is a difference among the sons: one by nature, another by grace.
Many creatures are invisible and visible: invisible, like Principalities and Powers, Thrones and Dominions; visible, like the sun, moon, stars, man, and earth. Therefore, there are various species and various substances of creatures. So, if you want to express the property of any creature, you will name either the sun, or the moon, or the stars; and thus what you consider to be significant is understood.
Moreover, if you were to say 'made' or 'created,' which they sometimes say about the Son, since many things have been made and created, you do not seem to have meant the property of substance, but rather the appearance of quality. For substance is one thing, quality another. Furthermore, we have said in another place that the Latins have translated οὐσίαν as 'substance.' But when the substance of God is spoken of, what else is signified except that God always exists? This is expressed by the very letters, because when the divine power is always being, that is, when it always exists, it is called οὐσία, with the order of one letter changed for the sake of sound and the conciseness and elegance of speech. Therefore, οὐσὶα, which always signifies God, declares how the appellation of ungenerated or generated is, as you wish, namely, that the Father is not from another, nor is the Son from Himself. Here, there seems to be a different species. Certainly, a distinct species, but an indistinct divinity.
You ask how this can be proven? I will demonstrate also in creatures a different species, different beginnings in many, and one substance, and I will produce examples from the Scriptures. Therefore, if this can be applicable in mortal things; in the same way as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit impose a law of necessity on divinity.
Indeed, all flying creatures, which appear to be of the same kind, are certainly of the same nature, just as there is one kind and one nature of eagles, and likewise of vultures and others according to their species. However, as for how they began to be flying creatures, we find three species and we have read that their origins have different causes. For it is written that God said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life, and the flying creatures flying above the earth (Gen. I, 20). And a little later, when God had made paradise and placed man in it, it is written that God formed beasts of the field and birds of the air from the earth (Gen. II, 19). Therefore, the birds in this place are figuratively represented as being from the earth. Moreover, you have also read that God said to the birds: Increase and multiply (Gen. I, 22); certainly commanding the increase of offspring from the union of male and female. Therefore, we also observe that those of one kind began in different ways: some from water, some from earth, some from the union of male and female; yet these are all of the same nature and do not have a difference in substance.
But what about the unity of nature, as our flesh is with the truth of the Lord's body? Yet both are derived from different causes and have different origins. For the flesh of the Lord, generated by the Spirit coming upon the Virgin (Luke 1:35), did not require the customary union of male and female intercourse. But our flesh, unless the male and female sexes unite in their natural channels, cannot be formed within the mother's womb. And yet, even though the cause of their generation is different, the flesh of Christ is one with all human flesh.
For the birth of the Virgin did not change nature, but it renewed the use of procreation. Indeed, flesh was born from flesh. Therefore, the Virgin had something of her own to give, for the mother did not give something foreign, but contributed her own from her womb in an unusual way, but in the usual manner. Therefore, the Virgin had flesh, which she transmitted by the established right of nature into the offspring. Therefore, Mary, who gave birth according to the flesh, and the nature of the one born, are not unlike brothers, for the Scripture says that he was to become like his brothers in every respect (Heb. II, 17). Likewise, our Son of God is similar, not according to the fullness of divinity, but according to the nature of the rational soul, and to express it more clearly, the truth of our human body.
But what can we say about Adam himself, who, being formed from the clay of the earth, surely begot sons of his own consorts of nature, participants of his race, heirs of his succession (Gen. II, 17)? Indeed, there are different beginnings in both parents and children, but there is one human nature; yet, the dissimilarity of origin did not prejudice the similarity of substance. Therefore, just as a son is similar to his father even in those things which, due to the frailty of human condition, could not possess the fullness of similarity, how then is the Son of God the true dissimilar to the Father?