Chapter VIII.
The questions regarding God's foreknowledge concerning the transgressions of Adam, and the belief in good and evil imprinted by divinity on human minds, are being resolved.
Again the question is: Did God know that Adam would transgress his commandments, or did He not know? If He did not know, then this is not an assertion of divine power. But if He did know, and nevertheless commanded something that He knew would be neglected, then God is not commanding anything superfluous. But He did command something superfluous to that first man Adam, which He knew would not be observed. But God does not do anything superfluous. Therefore, this is not Scripture from God. This objection is raised by those who do not accept the Old Testament and insert these questions. But these people must be overcome by their own judgment and opinion. For even though they do not refute the faith of the New Testament, they are used as examples to argue that they should believe the Old Testament: because when divine commands and deeds correspond to themselves, it is clear that both Testaments of one author should be believed. Therefore, let them learn that the commandment, which they will transgress with injustice, is not superfluous. For even the Lord Jesus himself chose Judas, whom he knew to be a traitor. But those who think that he was chosen by imprudence, detract from divine authority. But they cannot estimate this, since Scripture says: For Jesus knew who would betray him (John VI, 65). Therefore, let these opponents of the Old Testament be silenced.
39. But since even the Gentiles, if perhaps they object to this, seem to require an explanation; let them also accept by what reason the Son of God either commanded a transgressor or chose a betrayer. The Lord Jesus had come to save all sinners, and he should also have shown his will even with regard to the impious. And therefore he should not have passed over the matter of betrayal; so that everyone would take note that in his choice of even his betrayer he displayed a remarkable symbol of those to be saved, and neither Adam was harmed because he received a command, nor Judas because he was chosen. For God did not impose necessity either on those in prevarication or on this betrayal, because if each had guarded what they had received, they could have abstained from sin. Indeed, he did not know that all the Jews would believe, and yet he said, 'I have come only for the lost sheep of the house of Israel' (Matthew 15:24). Therefore, the fault is not in the one giving the command, but in the one who prevaricates. And what was in God, he showed to all that he wanted to set everyone free. Nevertheless, I do not say that he did not know that prevarication would happen, but rather because he knew it was going to happen, I assert: but it is not proper for him to deflect the blame of the perishing traitor onto himself, so that it could be attributed to God, since both of them fell. But now both are being reproved and convicted; because he received the commandment not to fall, and this one was also admitted into the office of apostleship, so that he could be called back from the desire of treason through God's grace; at the same time, so that while others are being convicted, it would benefit everyone. For sin would not exist if there were no prohibition. But if sin did not exist, perhaps not only wickedness but even virtue would not exist: for unless there were some seeds of wickedness, it could not subsist or flourish. For what is sin but the transgression of divine law and the disobedience of heavenly commandments? For we do not judge the heavenly commands by the ears of the body, but since it is the word of God, certain notions of good and evil have sprung up in us; while that which is evil, we naturally understand should be avoided, and that which is good, we naturally understand should be commanded. Therefore, in this, we seem to hear the voice of the Lord, which prohibits some things and commands others. And so, if anyone does not obey those things which we believe have once been commanded by God, he is considered subject to punishment. However, the commandment of God is not written with ink on stone tablets, but is impressed in our hearts by the spirit of the living God. Therefore, our own opinion becomes its own law. For if the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do what the law requires, they themselves are a law to themselves, who show the work of the law written on their hearts. Therefore, human opinion is to itself as the law of God.
Again, they raise another question from here, that they accuse this very opinion impressed by God on us, as if it were a prescription of divine law. They say, did He not know that man would sin, he who created him and impressed these opinions of good and evil? If you say that He did not know, you would think Him unworthy of the majesty of God; but if you say that God, being aware that man would sin, nevertheless impressed on him common opinions of good and evil, so that he could not preserve the perpetuity of life because of the mixture of evils, then you seem to indicate that God is not good, just as in the former case you did not represent God as knowing the future. And from here they argue that the human creature is not made by God. For as we have shown above that they say there is no command of God, so they say here: Therefore the human creature is not made by God, because God did not create evil. However, man has received the opinion of evil, when he is commanded to abstain from evil. But with this kind of argument, they try to assert that there is another good God, and another operator of man. To these, it must be answered immediately according to their opinion. For if they do not want man to be made by God, because man is a sinner, and they refuse this, so that God may not seem to have made a sinner, because they do not think of him as good who made a sinner; let them say whether they think the operator of man, made by God. For if that one, as they say, is made by God, the operator of man, how did the good God make the operator of evil? Surely not good, for the one who makes a sinner is not good; let it be avoided that it is worse to have made the operator of a sinner. For a good God ought to have prohibited the birth of him who had the substance of sin to enter. But if they say that the operator of evil was not begotten, it must be asked whether a good God could have prevented in any way the beginning of malice or not. For if He could not, He is weak; if He could and did not, He is not good. Therefore, if these things do not agree with themselves, neither do the opinions of heretics agree with themselves. Let us inquire, then, lest perhaps there be a reason why God, whether the operator be begotten or not begotten, allowed malice to enter into this world, when He could have prevented it.
Therefore, serving one and the same good God and Creator, if we can, let us assert that it is fitting for both of them to have grace, and let us not avoid the accusation of those who say: How can a good God, who not only allowed evil to enter this world, but also permitted such great confusion? But this accusation would only hold if it infected the power of the soul and the inner secrets of the mind in such a way that it could not be eradicated, and if the poison of incurable wounds were to infiltrate the mind and soul of our being; for then it would be more suitable to complain that although God is capable of all things, He allowed man to perish. But when our merciful God has reserved the remedies for repelling errors, and has not abolished the power to abolish all contagion; how irrational or unjust is it, if He allows our material to be tested with a certain tremor of human frailty; so that afterward, the more gracious grace may return the feeling of sins in man, and being conscious of his own frailty, that he has trembled so easily in deviating from the series of divine commandments, as if he feared losing the nail of his fluctuating soul, celestial mandates; attributing more to divine mercy, because He receives what was lost, and taking something for Himself from grace, that it may return.